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Abstract. At the center of contemporary debates over public law lies administrative
agencies’ discretion to impose rules. Yet for every one of these rules, there are also unrules
nearby. Often overlooked and sometimes barely visible, unrules are the decisions that
regulators make to lift or limit the scope of a regulatory obligation through, for instance,
waivers, exemptions, or exceptions. In some cases, unrules enable regulators to reduce
burdens on regulated entities or to conserve valuable government resources in ways that
make law more efficient. However, too much discretion to create unrules can facilitate
undue business influence over the law, weaken regulatory schemes, and even undermine
the rule of law. In this Article, we conduct the first systematic empirical investigation of
the hidden world of unrules. Using a computational-linguistic approach to identify
unrules across the Federal Register, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the United States Code,
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we show that unrules are an integral and substantial feature of the federal regulatory
system. Our analysis shows that, by several conservative measures, there exists one
obligation-alleviating word for approximately every five to six obligation-imposing
words in federal law. We also show that unrules are surprisingly unrestrained by
administrative law. In stark contrast to administrative law’s treatment of obligationimposing rules, regulators enjoy greater discretion when deploying unrules to alleviate
regulatory obligations. As a result, a major form of agency power remains hidden from
view and relatively unencumbered by law. Recognizing the central role that unrules play
in our regulatory system reveals the need to reorient administrative law and incorporate
unrules more explicitly into its assumptions, doctrines, and procedures.
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Introduction
Rules, as we all know, impose obligations. Federal law, for example,
imposes an obligation on manufacturers of new drugs and medical devices to
complete a rigorous safety and efficacy review process in accordance with
requirements established by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).1
Yet nearly three-quarters of all new drugs approved by the FDA and
introduced into the market never go through the full review process.2
Likewise, the vast majority of new medical devices that have entered the
marketplace in recent years have bypassed the FDA’s premarket-approval
process.3 In a similar manner, although Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regulations obligate commercial aircraft manufacturers to test every key
component of any new line of airplanes, when the Boeing Company developed
the initial, tragic version of its now-infamous 737 MAX airplanes, it followed
only an abbreviated certification process that allowed the company to sell its
planes to customers years earlier than usual.4
How could regulatory obligations on matters as vital as public health and
safety be bypassed? Sociologists of law have long noted that rules on the books
do not mirror rules in action.5 Yet a key mechanism helping to explain such
slippage—a mechanism we call an unrule—has so far escaped systematic
empirical study. Government possesses a ubiquitous yet often hidden power to
1. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2020) (imposing a duty on manufacturers of new drugs to

2.

3.

4.

5.

provide “adequate and well-controlled” clinical studies); id. § 860.7 (imposing rules for
determinations of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices); see also FDA’s Drug
Review Process: Continued, U.S. FDA, https://perma.cc/Z4FU-JJHR (last updated Aug. 24,
2015); Overview of Device Regulation, U.S. FDA, https://perma.cc/BSY8-GQ6W (last
updated Sept. 4, 2020).
Peter Loftus, Fast-Track Drug Approval, Designed for Emergencies, Is Now Routine, WALL
ST. J. (July 5, 2019, 10:45 AM ET), https://perma.cc/L3Q6-FMTR (to locate, click “View
the live page”) (stating that the FDA “approved a record 43 new drugs [in 2018] through
fast-track programs that skip or shorten major steps other drugs must pass, or 73% of
total new drugs”).
INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE
FDA 510(k) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS 4 (2011) (stating that only 1% of medical
devices enter the market through the premarket-approval process); see also JEANNE
LENZER, THE DANGER WITHIN US: AMERICA’S UNTESTED, UNREGULATED MEDICAL
DEVICE INDUSTRY AND ONE MAN’S BATTLE TO SURVIVE IT 7, 63, 120-22 (2017) (noting
that most high-risk medical devices escape full regulatory review).
See Airworthiness Certification, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://perma.cc/CGH8-YXE8
(last updated Dec. 18, 2020, 9:10 AM EST) (noting that the 737 MAX was approved
under an “Amended Type Certificate,” which can “typically take 3-5 years to complete,”
whereas “the certification of a new aircraft type can take between 5 and 9 years”).
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 14-15 (1910);
see also STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ELIZABETH MERTZ, LAW IN
ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER 14 (2007).

888

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

limit or alleviate otherwise applicable regulatory obligations. Sometimes this
power to alleviate obligations leads regulatory agencies to grant individual
waivers, exemptions, or variances—a type of unrule that we call dispensations.6
At other times, unrules comprise what we call carveouts—exceptions and other
limitations embedded within rules themselves, such as when a new regulation
“grandfathers” existing businesses and exempts them from the coverage of its
obligations.7 Both types of unrules—carveouts and dispensations—can be found
within every source and domain of law, including regulations governing
health care,8 securities,9 environmental protection,10 transportation,11 and
campaign finance.12
Unrules can be highly consequential. With medical devices linked to an
estimated 1.7 million injuries and 80,000 deaths over the past decade,13 it
matters, for example, that 70% of all recalls of high-risk medical devices from
2005 to 2009 involved products approved through the FDA’s special, fast-track
approval process called the 510(k) program.14 Ostensibly designed as an
exception for devices deemed “substantially equivalent” to an already-approved
device,15 this 510(k) program helps explain why today most medical devices do
not go through a government review process intended to demonstrate safety
and effectiveness.16 These devices escape review even though every year
hundreds of them, including surgical mesh and joint replacements, are
approved for implantation into patients’ bodies and can lead to devastating
health consequences if they malfunction.17 Former FDA Commissioner David

6. See infra Part I.A.2.
7. See infra Part I.A.1.
8. See, e.g., infra notes 61-62, 93, 136-40 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 79, 149 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., infra notes 19-23, 48-49, 56-58, 94 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 84, 191 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., infra note 147 and accompanying text.
13. Implant Files, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, https://perma.cc/37N6-

5UMR (archived Dec. 30, 2020) (to locate, click the “Key findings” tab).
14. See ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG

BUSINESS AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 135 (2017).
15. 21 C.F.R. § 807.100(a)(1) (2020); see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 132-35; LENZER,
supra note 3, at 120-22.
16. See INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 3, at 4.
17. See Diana Zuckerman, Paul Brown & Aditi Das, Lack of Publicly Available Scientific
Evidence on the Safety and Effectiveness of Implanted Medical Devices, 174 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1781, 1782, 1786 (2014); see also Jeanne Lenzer & Shannon Brownlee, The FDA Is
Still Letting Doctors Implant Untested Devices into Our Bodies, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2019,
9:42 AM CST), https://perma.cc/RY4T-E6PD.
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Kessler has characterized the 510(k) unrule as “an exception, in essence a little
loophole, that . . . became the rule.”18
Or consider another example: a loophole established by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowing international tankers and
other ships to escape from complying with otherwise applicable water-pollution
requirements when they enter the Great Lakes and other major inland bodies of
water.19 According to one EPA official, the agency adopted a regulatory
exemption for ships in 1973 simply because “[a]t the time we thought that was
not an important area to deal with.”20 But as a result of the agency’s unrule, ships
coming from the Saint Lawrence Seaway discharged ballast water into the Great
Lakes for decades, creating a runaway invasion of zebra mussels and other
nonnative species.21 The invasive mussels clog municipal drainage pipes
throughout the Great Lakes and cause millions of dollars in annual property
damage.22 Similar problems from contaminated-water discharges from ships
have plagued other rivers and lakes throughout the United States, damaging
fisheries and creating up to an estimated $17 billion in annual economic costs as
of 1995—not to mention an unquantified risk to human health from the
pathogens and other pollutants contained in such discharges.23
Yet today, debate over government regulation too often overlooks the
consequences of government’s power to alleviate obligations and instead
focuses almost exclusively on a single dimension of regulatory power: the
power to impose obligations.24 Prominent members of the academy,
18. THE BLEEDING EDGE, at 18:30 (Kirby Dirk dir. 2018).
19. See 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,528, 13,530 (May 22, 1973).
20. Nw. Env’t Advocs. v. U.S. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting EPA official

Craig Vogt).
21. Joel Brammeier & Thom Cmar, Pathways Toward a Policy of Preventing New Great Lakes

Invasions, in INVASIVE SPECIES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: ECOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY 356, 358-60 (Reuben P. Keller, Marc W. Cadotte & Glenn
Sandiford eds., 2015).
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-1026T, INVASIVE SPECIES: PROGRESS AND
CHALLENGES IN PREVENTING INTRODUCTION INTO U.S. WATERS VIA THE BALLAST
WATER IN SHIPS 4 (2005), https://perma.cc/3RT6-VQCD.
23. OFF. OF WASTEWATER MGMT., U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED 2013 VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT (VGP) 129-30, 134 (2011), https://perma.cc/
M5QN-WZXS.
24. The core assumption underlying debates over the modern administrative state is that
agency power is the power to impose obligations. For a recent exchange over the status
of the administrative state, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—
Foreword: 1930s Redux—The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017)
(noting a resurgence of “anti-administrativist[ ]” voices calling for a retrenchment of
administrative power to impose obligations on business, but arguing that this
movement is unlikely to unravel the administrative state); Aaron L. Nielson, Response,
Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 10-12 (2017) (defending
anti-administrativism as a sensible response to agency excesses); Mila Sohoni,
footnote continued on next page
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government, and the courts routinely rail against crippling overregulation and
clamor that a tangle of red tape is suffocating private enterprise and hindering
economic growth.25 Critics frequently cite the sheer volume of agency
regulations as evidence that regulatory burdens have run amok.26 These
concerns have contributed to both a political dialogue and a set of
administrative law principles that today disproportionately aim to protect
individuals and businesses from the imposition of regulatory obligations.27
We seek with this Article to correct the prevailing, myopic understanding
of regulatory power and discretion in the United States. Obligation imposition
is only one side of the coin. Governmental authorities also exert significant
power to alleviate obligations—power that can also be misused and create
dramatic consequences for public welfare. A failure to appreciate the
significance of unrules thus contributes both to an inflated sense of the
onerousness of the U.S. regulatory system and to a cramped view of the kind of
government discretion that administrative law has long sought to govern.
In this Article, we offer a unified framework for understanding
governmental power to alleviate obligations. We also offer, for the first time,
systematic evidence of this less visible aspect of power and show how our
findings call into question prevailing accounts that have relied exclusively on
the quantification of regulatory obligations.28 Our analysis implies that
government regulation is far less onerous—and far more flexible—than
previously imagined. By showing the ubiquity of government’s power to

25.

26.

27.
28.

Response, A Bureaucracy—If You Can Keep It, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 18-24 (2017)
(suggesting that anti-administrativism may be more successful than Metzger predicts).
See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2012) (“It is
impossible to open a newspaper without seeing some such version of the claim that
America suffers from ‘hyperlexis,’ or the existence of ‘too much law.’ ”); see also PHILIP K.
HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 26 (rev.
ed. 2011) (arguing that a proliferation of rules hampers business activity and the overall
exercise of common sense); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW.
U. L. REV. 767, 767-70 (1977). For additional sources offering this criticism, see note 152
and accompanying text below.
See, e.g., CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 44-46
(2020), https://perma.cc/3AEV-W996. Even some scholars who recognize the benefits
of regulation have emphasized the importance of reducing regulatory burdens. See, e.g.,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 1-2 (2013).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 393, 398 (2015).
E.g., CREWS, supra note 26, at 4 (“employ[ing] a placeholder estimate for regulatory
compliance and economic effects of federal intervention of $1.9 trillion annually”);
Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical Database on IndustrySpecific Regulations for All United States Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997-2012, 11
REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 109, 110 (2017) (“provid[ing] a novel measure that quantifies
regulatory demands”).
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alleviate obligations, we reveal how previous critiques of regulatory burdens
overstate the true size, scope, and intrusiveness of regulation. We demonstrate
through empirical analysis that an “unrulemaking” authority is omnipresent in
the federal regulatory corpus.29 Our empirical analysis leads to a simple but
powerful truth: A regulatory system can be understood only as the net effects
of both its rules and its unrules.
That understanding also makes apparent that administrative law can never
fully ensure the responsible, public-interested use of governmental power if it
neglects one side of that power. Through its requirements for transparency,
benefit–cost analysis, and judicial review of new agency regulations, for
example, current administrative law tends to impose greater constraints on
government agencies’ ability to impose obligations than on their ability to
alleviate them.30 Swaths of administrative discretion to alleviate or eliminate
obligations remain effectively unchecked. This bias inhibits administrative law’s
ability to ensure that agencies make well-considered alleviating decisions. When
it comes to doling out waivers, for example, the absence of sufficient process and
transparency requirements opens the door to a type of “unregulatory” capture.
The comparative lack of judicial oversight of many unrules risks leaving certain
alleviating decisions untested and poorly justified.31 The result is a regulatory
ship with a pronounced list.
Our goal here is to bring unrules to the fore and to reorient debate over the
U.S. regulatory state. To be sure, we are not the first ones to call attention to
the existence of actions that governments can take to alleviate obligations,
such as by issuing waivers and exemptions. Previous scholarship has identified
and discussed certain types of unrules, and we acknowledge and build on this
work in the Parts that follow.32 Yet the predominant focus of the work of

29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. Such a bias in oversight should concern even those with libertarian commitments, as

agencies can sometimes wield unrulemaking power in ways that enhance their power
to impose obligations—such as by offering alleviation of some obligations in exchange
for the acceptance of others the agency could not impose. See infra Part I.B.3.
32. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 280-81 (developing the concept of
“administrative equity”); Jim Rossi, Comment, Waivers, Flexibility, and Reviewability, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359 (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The APA and
the Back-End of Regulation: Procedures for Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1159,
1160 (2004) (differentiating between what they call “front-end” and “back-end”
adjustments); Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and
the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 167
(examining “the pursuit of regulatory equity through an administrative ‘exceptions
process’ ”). Of course, other important work on waivers focuses on private individuals’
willingness to consent to giving up their legal rights, but private waivers of rights are
footnote continued on next page
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regulatory and administrative law scholars has been on agency discretion to
impose legal obligations, too often overlooking the pervasive power that
government possesses to alleviate obligations.33
In Part I, we present a unified taxonomy of unrules comprising the two
main types of unrules: carveouts and dispensations. Although, as we explain
below, important differences exist between carveouts and dispensations, both
share the effect of limiting or alleviating obligations. Only by considering both
types of unrules together, under a unified framework, is it possible to see the
full extent to which the U.S. regulatory system comprises the alleviation of
obligations as well as their imposition.34 Indeed, we know of no previous work
that has developed a common framework to link together the two main types
of unrules.35 We go on in Part I to show why greater recognition of obligation
alleviation is necessary. Although we acknowledge that unrules, if used in a
responsible manner, can render regulations less burdensome, more fair, and
more efficient, we also emphasize how the use of unrules can undermine
important health and safety protections, enable regulatory capture, and
threaten the rule of law.
In Part II, we show that unrules are ubiquitous. We report the results of
computer-assisted content analyses of the Federal Register, the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), and the United States Code indicating that unrules are a
substantial and widespread feature of federal regulatory law in the United
States. Our analysis documents that, across the various sources, there exists one
obligation-alleviating word for approximately every five to six obligationnot unrules. See Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478, 480 (1981) (offering “a general theory for waiver of rights by private persons”).
33. See AARON L. NIELSON, WAIVERS, EXEMPTIONS, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: AN
EXAMINATION OF AGENCY NONENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/
HSR4-2MYJ (noting that “agency nonenforcement of legal duties—through means
such as waivers, exemptions, and prosecutorial discretion—has received less attention
than agency efforts to see that legal duties are complied with”). In this respect,
administrative law scholars appear to be not unlike other legal scholars. See Frederick
Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1991) (observing that many see
exceptions as being “to law what electric windows are to automobiles—useful
accessories but hardly central to the enterprise” and that “the exception is an invisible
topic in legal theory”). For further discussion, see Part III below.
34. See infra Part III.
35. The literature does recognize some types of carveouts, such as grandfather clauses. See,
e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681705 (2007) (providing a comprehensive history of the EPA’s grandfathering of existing
sources under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards). But probably
the most work on unrules among administrative law scholars has centered on what we
call dispensations. See generally Aman, supra note 32; Rossi, supra note 32. To our
knowledge, no one has linked these two together to show how pervasive obligation
alleviation is in the U.S. regulatory state.
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imposing words in federal law.36 We also explain why, for reasons related to
data availability and the methodology we use, this ratio almost certainly
understates substantially the prevalence of unrules. The analysis of
dispensations in Part II, for example, almost exclusively focuses on language
authorizing government agencies to grant dispensations. It is relatively rare for
agencies to publish actual dispensations in the sources of law we analyze.
Finally, in Part III, we show that, despite the importance and ubiquity of
unrules, agencies are less constrained by administrative law doctrine when
they exercise their power to reduce the application, scope, or stringency of
obligations than when they assert their power to impose obligations. Although
the precise nature of procedural and other legal constraints varies across
different unrules, in general the law requires the government to proceed
through more stringent procedural steps when imposing regulatory
obligations than when alleviating them.37 Consequently, a major form of
governmental discretion remains not only relatively hidden from view but
also less encumbered by legal constraints designed to ensure public-interested
exercise of government power. Recognizing the ubiquity of unrules highlights
the need to reorient both doctrine and scholarship so as to bring agencies’
power to alleviate obligations more squarely into the center of prevailing
debates over the regulatory state.
I.

The Hidden World of Unrules

When any governmental authority, whether a legislature or an
administrative agency, creates new law, it imposes a new legal obligation—or,
simply put, it creates a rule.38 A rule consists of multiple components. One
36. See infra Part II.
37. Although Parts I and II of this Article make clear that rules and unrules can be adopted

by Congress or by administrative agencies, given the salience of agencies in imposing
and alleviating obligations as part of their implementation of statutory schemes, our
focus in Part III is on administrative agencies’ use of unrules—the domain of
administrative law. Cf. Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Rulemaking in the United
States, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 37, 39 (2019) (“Given the pervasiveness of rulemaking, US
public policymaking may be better conceived of as chiefly regulatory, rather than
chiefly legislative.”).
38. Although we use the term rule in this Article to refer to legal obligations, our focus and
terminology should be distinguished from those that may be found in at least two
other contexts. First, our use of the term rule is not limited to those obligations
imposed by administrative agencies, even though the word “rule” is used in the
Administrative Procedure Act to refer to such agency-imposed obligations. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(4). We mean rule to refer to any prescriptive or proscriptive statement imposing
a legal obligation. Many such obligations are indeed imposed by administrative
agencies—and when we do mean to limit our meaning just to agency rules we generally
use the term “regulations.” But rules are also adopted and imposed by legislatures and
courts. Second, we do not mean to limit our use of the word “rule” to its meaning in
footnote continued on next page

894

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

component defines the rule’s targets or obligatees—that is, the class of individuals
or entities upon which an obligation is imposed. The regulatory target itself can
be defined by multiple criteria, such as the line of business or activities in which
targeted entities engage, the size of the entities, and their age or the duration of
their relevant activities.39 Another component—the rule’s command—articulates
what the target must do or refrain from doing or what outcome it must achieve
or avoid. Commands or legal duties themselves can comprise multiple facets and
prove at times quite complex.40 That complexity can increase further due to
other rule components that provide conditions under which a legal command
will apply—or under which distinct, alternative commands will apply.
Each of a rule’s components—its defined scope, command, and
conditions41—affords the rule’s creator the opportunity to calibrate the rule to
fit particular problems and circumstances.42 But these components also mean
that a regulator—either when designing a rule or in seeking to apply or enforce
it—has an opportunity to leave some entities or individuals outside the scope of
the rule, to lessen its commands, or to modify its conditions. Such a decision to
circumscribe or lighten legal obligations, or to exempt some individuals,
businesses, or other relevant private or public entities from a rule’s application,
would constitute what we refer to as an obligation alleviation—or an unrule.
Unrules can be thought of as akin to the holes in a block of regulatory Swiss

39.

40.

41.

42.

legal scholars’ rules-versus-standards debate. See generally Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). Legal obligations can be tightly or loosely
specified, but they are still obligations—and hence both rules and standards are rules in
the sense we mean here.
Although many rules target businesses and other private actors, such as individuals and
nonprofit organizations, rules target governmental entities as well. Statutory or
regulatory provisions that obligate administrative agencies to follow specified
procedures or to provide certain public benefits to qualified applicants are also rules.
For further discussion of different types of legal commands and how they affect the
design of rules, see TRANSP. RSCH. BD., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., SPECIAL
REPORT 324, DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES, at ch. 2
(2018), https://perma.cc/7EWH-9KNV.
Other components include the nature of the command—that is, mandate or prohibition—
that the rule imposes on its target as well as the potential consequences for violating that
command. See Cary Coglianese, Analysis, Regulation’s Four Core Components, REGUL. REV.
(Sept. 17, 2012), https://perma.cc/J4L9-BUGS; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE 23 (1991) (analyzing prescriptive rules by “disassembling such rules to observe
their characteristic structure and component parts”). An appreciation of the components
of legal rules can be traced back to the early legal-lexiconic work of Wesley Hohfeld. See
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-30 (1913).
Of course, rule creators have to make all of these calibration decisions under conditions
of uncertainty, which greatly complicates the degree to which rules can be precisely
fitted to particular problems and circumstances. See Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty,
Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1321, 1327 (2016).
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cheese. Just as with Swiss cheese, the rules have real substance, as they are
backed with the force of the state. But the holes are also constitutive of what a
regulatory system means for business and society—and how effective, costly,
and fair that system can be.43
In this Part, we present a taxonomy of two types of unrules—carveouts
and dispensations—and we illustrate each with examples from existing law.
We then discuss the purposes that can be served by both types of unrules, as
well as the risks that they pose in terms of regulatory ineffectiveness,
unfairness, and the undermining of the rule of law.
A. A Unified Taxonomy of Unrules
At the outset, it is helpful to make three additional points to clarify what we
mean by unrules. First, unrules can be found in any source of law—that is, in
statutes as well as agency regulations. Although the latter sources are also
referred to as agency “rules,” we generally reserve the term rule in this Article to
refer to any kind of legal instrument that imposes a legal obligation. Unless
otherwise indicated, we refer to agency-adopted rules as regulations.44 That said,
while we are interested in obligation alleviation as a general feature of
government, we are particularly interested in it as a feature of the administrative
arm of government. Given that agencies impose many more rules than does
Congress, they also possess greater opportunity to deploy unrules—and thus
administrative law should be more attentive to how agencies exercise their
discretion to issue unrules.

43. Some legal theorists have suggested that these “holes” in rules are inevitable. See, e.g.,

Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1103-04
(2009) (drawing on Carl Schmitt’s theory of the “exception” to argue that
underspecification in administrative law is inevitable); Schauer, supra note 33, at 873-75
(arguing that the limits of language make exceptions to rules inevitable); Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 962 (1995) (noting that it is “familiar
to find rules that have explicit or implicit exceptions for cases of necessity or
emergency” and “unfamiliar to find rules without any such exceptions”). Even so, to
state that unrules are inevitable is not to commit to a position on whether they are
intrinsic (or internal) to the rule itself in a philosophical sense. See, e.g., Claire Oakes
Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 505, 508-09
(2000) (distinguishing internal “qualifications” from “exceptions,” the latter of which
are external to the rule). Nor does it mean that every limitation on a rule should be
thought of as an unrule. Limitations on a rule’s scope or applicability that have nothing
to do with the underlying purpose of the rule are inevitable, but they would not
reasonably be considered unrules. For instance, a rule that imposes obligations on
automobile manufacturers to build cars that meet brake-safety standards necessarily
does not also contain the obligation that banks retain adequate capital reserves. Such
irrelevant limitations are not unrules, as we define them.
44. See supra note 38.
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Second, unrules are the opposite of rules in that they lift, limit, or dispense
with obligations rather than impose them. Unrules are not the opposite of
rules merely because they do not bind, but instead because they actually
alleviate. We mention this because much has been written by scholars over the
years about nonbinding norms, whether called guidance or soft law.45 In a
certain sense, these soft legal tools could plausibly be thought of as the opposite
of rules as well, simply because they are nonbinding. And, indeed, there may
even be some overlap between unrules and guidance, at least where guidance
constructively alleviates obligations, as it might with no-action letters and
other forms of soft law that promise the nonenforcement of legal obligations.
What has made guidance a controversial tool in the administrative arsenal,
though, is not its potential to clarify the alleviation of obligations, but rather
its use by agencies to circumvent the normal processes for issuing rules or
orders and to pursue regulatory goals by using guidance to impose what in
practice become constructive obligations.46 That practice is not our concern
here. When we focus on unrules, we mean to refer to the actual lifting of
otherwise applicable obligations—not the establishment of nonbinding norms.
Finally, just like rules, unrules can apply to public as well as private actors
or entities. Federal efforts undertaken during the Trump Administration to
expand a border wall between the United States and Mexico, for example,
benefited from an unrule that alleviated obligations that would ordinarily have
been imposed on government construction projects.47 The Secretary of
Homeland Security waived more than two dozen otherwise applicable laws,
including those that would have normally demanded thorough environmental
reviews of the new construction projects.48 Just as unrules alleviating private
45. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical

Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 165, 167-69 (2019); Jacob E. Gersen
& Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 57477 (2008).
46. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1372 (1992);
Parrillo, supra note 45, at 168-69, 174.
47. See Proclamation No. 9,844, 3 C.F.R. 12 (2020), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1621 note (Supp. I
2020) (declaring a national emergency at the southern border); 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a)
(giving the Secretary of Defense broad authority over military construction during a
national emergency).
48. The REAL ID Act of 2005 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to “waive all
legal requirements . . . [as] necessary to ensure expeditious construction” of a border
wall. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 102, 119 Stat. 231, 306 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103 note (Improvement of Barriers at Border)). In a series of decisions, the Secretary
of Homeland Security has invoked this authority to waive the application of the
National Environmental Policy Act and other laws in order to facilitate the
construction of sections of new or improved border wall without environmental
reviews. See, e.g., Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended, 83 Fed. Reg. 3,012,
footnote continued on next page
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entities’ obligations can be consequential, so too can unrules vis-à-vis
governmental entities. In the absence of the environmental reviews normally
required for government construction projects, for example, some of the
Trump Administration’s border-wall sections exacerbated serious waterrunoff problems during the desert “monsoon season,” prompting officials to
leave certain gates open to allow water to pass through—but in doing so
undermining whatever function these walls served in deterring illegal entry
into the United States.49
Having clarified further what we mean by unrules, we now turn to
classifying them. In the two Subparts to follow, we elaborate on the two types
of unrules: carveouts and dispensations. Understanding these types of unrules
is essential for both seeing the extent of unrules in regulatory law (the aim of
Part II of this Article) and understanding how administrative law currently
tends to provide less oversight of unrules (the aim of Part III).
Yet as we distinguish carveouts from dispensations in the following
Subparts, it is important not to lose sight of what they share in common: They
both alleviate obligations. Obligation alleviation is the sine qua non of unrules,
and it is why we treat these two types of regulatory decisions as part of the
same phenomenon. What distinguishes carveouts and dispensations from each
other concerns their scope and timing. These differences are summarized in
Table 1 below.
Carveouts apply on a categorical basis to any eligible person or entity
meeting the criteria or conditions for obligation alleviation, while dispensations
are granted on a case-by-case basis. By and large, this difference between the two
types of unrules tracks the distinction between the two types of agency actions in
administrative law: rules and orders.50 A rule, in the sense of an agency regulation,
3,013-14 (Jan. 22, 2018). Several of these waivers have been upheld by the Ninth Circuit.
See, e.g., In re Border Infrastructure Env’t Litig., 915 F.3d 1213, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2019)
(upholding DHS’s authority to waive the environmental laws).
49. See Nick Miroff, Trump’s Border Wall, Vulnerable to Flash Floods, Needs Large Storm Gates
Left Open for Months, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2020, 4:37 PM CST), https://perma.cc/
WU7P-8V8E.
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6). The APA’s distinction between rules and orders is widely
understood by administrative law scholars to hinge on the generalized effect of a rule
on more than just specified individuals or entities, which contrasts with an order’s
express targeting of particular individuals or entities. This is not to deny that the APA’s
definitions of rules and orders have generated some confusion because the statute’s
definition of a rule makes reference to the “whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect.” Id. § 551(4) (emphasis added); see also
Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of “Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1077, 1077-80 (2004). The conventional scholarly emphasis on the distinction
between general and particular action contrasts with the occasional judicial intimation
that what distinguishes a rule from an order is the “future effect” of the former. See, e.g.,
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). But
this judicial view overlooks that orders can and often do have future effect as well. The
footnote continued on next page
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Table 1
Taxonomy of Unrules
Carveouts

Dispensations

Application

Categorical

Case-by-case

Timing

At the time of the imposition of an
obligation (e.g., adoption or
amendment of a regulation)

After the imposition of an
obligation (e.g., after the adoption
or amendment of a regulation)

imposes obligations generally on any individuals or entities falling into the
category covered by the rule and its conditions.51 An order, by contrast,
follows an adjudicatory process and can then result in the imposition of an
obligation on only a specified set of individuals or entities.52 Carveouts and
dispensations have a parallel scope: Carveouts apply generally, while
dispensations apply specifically—but instead of imposing obligations, they each
avoid or alleviate obligations.
Carveouts and dispensations can also be distinguished based on their
timing. Carveouts are put in place at the time a rule is written or amended.
They appear within or are created by the very same textual source that also
imposes an obligation. By contrast, dispensations arise later, after the creation
of a rule or its amendment. A dispensation grants a special status to an
individual or entity whereby an otherwise applicable, previously established
obligation no longer applies.
To illustrate our unrules taxonomy, we provide examples of both
carveouts and dispensations in the two Subparts to follow. Some of these
examples are explicit, as when carveouts are stated as express exemptions in
statutes and regulations or when dispensations are memorialized in waivers or
emphasis on the generality of rules not only comports better with the scholarly
consensus; it also tracks how the Supreme Court has long distinguished rulemaking
from adjudication for due process purposes. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). Although our distinction between carveouts
and dispensations does have certain features of both generality and temporality, it
tends to mirror, at a conceptual level, the widely accepted administrative law
distinction between rules and orders that is based on the generality of the former. Of
course, we make the comparison between carveouts and dispensations and between
rules and orders purely for heuristic reasons. Agencies must use one or the other action
defined in § 551—that is, a rule or an order—to alleviate obligations as much as to
impose them. An agency-created carveout will be part of a § 551 rule, while a
dispensation will be executed as a § 551 order.
51. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445-46.
52. See Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908); S. Ry. Co. v.
Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1933).
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no-action letters. But obligation alleviation can also take place implicitly or
constructively, such as when an agency uses its discretion not to enforce a
regulation against a specific entity (a constructive dispensation) or when an
agency leaves a natural target for an obligation out of the scope of a regulation
without drawing attention to that decision in the regulatory text (a
constructive carveout).53 Of course, as with many legal distinctions, it may be
possible to find a few examples that could straddle the boundary between
carveouts and dispensations. In this respect, the two types of unrules also share
another characteristic in common with the two types of agency actions used to
impose obligations (namely, rules and orders): The differences between them
can sometimes prove vexing. Notwithstanding the possibility of an occasional
example challenging the distinction between the two types of unrules, our
unified taxonomy helps reveal the extent to which the power of obligation
alleviation runs through the regulatory state and the ways in which
administrative law governs the exercise of that power.
1.

Carveouts

Carveouts, as noted above, are explicit or implicit exceptions to regulatory
obligations—for certain groups of individuals, types of firms, time periods, or
classes of activities—that are baked into the sources of rules themselves. They
serve to limit the scope or applicability of obligations that otherwise would have
applied to entities or activities falling within the coverage of a rule.54 Sometimes
regulatory targets are exempted entirely from a rule; other times they are subject
to less onerous obligations. In either case, because carveouts are embedded within

53. These kinds of constructive unrules present a special challenge for administrative law,

which generally is triggered when an agency formalizes an action by publishing it in a
source of binding law. See infra Part III.B.
54. Carveouts are thus deregulatory in the sense that, like all unrules, they alleviate
obligations. Yet carveouts still keep the underlying regulatory obligation intact for at
least some entities or under some circumstances. By contrast, what is commonly referred
to as “deregulation” usually refers to the wholesale repeal or reconfiguration of existing
obligations. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF
DEREGULATION (1985) (chronicling the economic deregulation of the air-transport,
trucking, and telecommunications sectors in the 1970s); ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM
DEREGULATION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH (2004)
(reviewing the deregulation of the airline and telecommunications industries). A British
commentator has used the term “unregulation” to refer to a softer form of deregulation
represented by various regulatory-simplification and burden-reduction efforts around
the world. See ROBIN ELLISON, RED TAPE: MANAGING EXCESS IN LAW, REGULATION AND
THE COURTS 280-349 (2018) (describing various efforts to try to simplify laws and reduce
their overall burdens). Although obligation alleviation may form part of any particular
regulatory simplification project, the existence of carveouts may actually increase the
complexity of regulation and thus could impede simplification.
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a rule, all entities whose characteristics or activities fall within the domain of a
carveout can be assured that their obligations have been alleviated.
On some level, every rule necessarily contains what could be thought of as a
carveout. The definition of a rule’s various components must demarcate the
boundaries of the rule, which determine to whom (and what and when) the rule
applies—and, by extension, to whom (and what and when) it does not apply.55
But at times carveouts can limit the scope of the rule in ways that are not
constitutive of or intrinsic to the motivating purpose of the rule—and thus they
may even serve to undermine that purpose. For instance, a variety of statutory
provisions expressly exempt harmful waste fluids produced during hydraulic
fracturing for natural gas from obligations that would otherwise be imposed on
the handling of these pollutants under the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, and federal hazardous waste laws.56 One such carveout—widely
referred to as the Halliburton loophole57—came into existence when the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 added an exemption to the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974.
The Halliburton loophole did not come into existence because hydraulic
fracturing fluids had been found to be safe in drinking water. Instead, it resulted
from lobbying pressure by producers of natural gas.58
The Halliburton loophole also illustrates how carveouts can arise after a
rule is initially put into place. Although carveouts can be embedded within the
original source of a rule (for example, a statute or regulation), they can also be
added later through amendments that narrow a rule’s scope or coverage.59
Many of the regulatory obligations imposed by the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and
its resulting regulations initially applied to all banks, but in 2018 Congress

55. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. The boundaries contained in the rule are

56.

57.
58.

59.

distinct from justified reasons for departing from the strict meaning of the rule. See
generally Finkelstein, supra note 43.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B). See generally William J. Brady & James P. Crannell,
Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal
Government and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENV’T L. 39, 43-52 (2012) (chronicling the
series of exemptions for hydraulic fracturing from federal environmental requirements).
See Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/
PR8V-LTDP.
See Charles Davis, The Politics of “Fracking”: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Practices in
Colorado and Texas, 29 REV. POL’Y RSCH. 177, 182 (2012); Hannah Wiseman, Untested
Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 115, 144-45 (2009).
For examples of amendments in the context of administrative rulemaking, see
generally Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity & Lisa Peters, Dynamic
Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017) (demonstrating that agencies frequently revisit
existing regulations to adapt them to changing circumstances and at times to dole out
regulatory relief—or what we call obligation alleviation).
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amended the Act to carve out smaller community banks from some of its
capital reserve requirements.60
Carveouts can take myriad different forms. For instance, when various
state public-health orders during the COVID-19 crisis obligated many
businesses to shut down their operations, they explicitly contained carveouts
for those businesses that provided “essential services.”61 When the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) imposed a mandate that businesses with fifty or more full-time
employees provide health insurance for their employees, it necessarily carved
businesses with fewer than fifty employees out of the statute’s obligation.62
Likewise, when Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970, it aimed to clean up
the pollution that factories had been spewing into the air at will, but the Act
provided that certain pollution-reduction obligations imposed under the law
would apply only to new or significantly modified industrial operations, not to
existing facilities.63
Lawmakers can adopt carveouts not merely with respect to regulatory
targets but also with respect to the applicable time periods covered by a rule.
Many rules will include phase-in periods when they are first adopted, and the
length of these periods is an important component in defining, as well as
alleviating, the rules’ obligations. For example, in 2018 the Trump
Administration issued a regulation that extended the original compliance
deadlines of an EPA coal-ash-disposal regulation adopted in the wake of the
2008 TVA Kingston coal disaster.64
60. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-

61.

62.

63.

64.

174, § 201, 132 Stat. 1296, 1306-07 (2018) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371 note (Capital
Simplification for Qualifying Community Banks)).
See, e.g., Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-89 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/UB75-MCY9;
Memorandum from Jared Moskowitz, State Coordinating Officer, to Florida Div. of
Emergency Mgmt. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/4CY3-PQZ6. For a related discussion,
see Cary Coglianese, Opinion, Obligation Alleviation During the COVID-19 Crisis, REGUL.
REV. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/6WFZ-AJVQ.
See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H. On small-business exemptions more generally, see SUSAN M.
GATES & KRISTIN J. LEUSCHNER, RAND CORP., RESEARCH BRIEF: IS SPECIAL REGULATORY
TREATMENT FOR SMALL BUSINESSES WORKING AS INTENDED? 1 (2007), https://perma.cc/
KD5E-QWPM (“[S]mall businesses often receive special regulatory treatment, such as
exemptions from legislation or extended deadlines for compliance.”).
See Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1683-84 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411). See generally Nash & Revesz, supra note 35, at 1681-96
(providing a comprehensive history of the EPA’s grandfathering of existing sources
under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards).
Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion
Residuals from Electric Utilities; Amendments to the National Minimum Criteria
(Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36,435, 36,440-43 (July 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 257); see also Coal Ash Rule, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM
(Dec. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/G2LA-TEUA.
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Carveouts are often explicitly stated in a statute or regulation, as with each
of the examples we have just presented. But they can also be inferred from a
rule’s language or context.65 For example, an EPA regulation prohibiting
hospital employees from disposing of unused medicines by flushing them
down a toilet or drain—a practice that raises concern about contaminating
drinking-water supplies—is written so that it applies only to those drugs
considered “hazardous waste.”66 Someone reading that rule might not
appreciate that, in reality, drugs classified as hazardous waste are a minority of
all drugs. But the carveout is still there, even though the rule is not expressly
written as granting an exemption for the disposal of the vast majority of drugs.
In practice, hospital workers continue to flush most drugs down the drain, just
as the carveout permits. 67
To summarize, a carveout can be implicit or explicit, as well as be present
within a rule at its adoption or created at a later time. If created at a later time,
it can be embodied in an amendment to the earlier rule or established by a
separate nonenforcement policy that broadly covers one or more categories of
regulated targets, activities, or time periods. Regardless of the form it takes, a
carveout categorically alleviates obligations for the targets or activities falling
outside the scope of the rule or into an exempted category.
2.

Dispensations

Dispensations, by contrast, involve the case-by-case suspension of
otherwise applicable and preexisting obligations for particular individuals or
entities.68 Dispensations may grant individualized extensions of compliance
65. Schauer, supra note 33, at 874 (“Where the language in which the rule is written

contains a word or a familiar phrase that itself excludes what the drafters wish to
exclude from the scope of the rule, no exception is necessary.”). We also recognize the
possibility that, in any hard case, what might otherwise be thought to be the force of a
rule might give way to unwritten principles or entirely separate sets of values not
explicitly accounted for in the rule’s text. For related philosophical and jurisprudential
discussions of the defeasibility of rules, see generally LUÍS DUARTE D’ALMEIDA,
ALLOWING FOR EXCEPTIONS: A THEORY OF DEFENCES AND DEFEASIBILITY IN LAW (2015),
and THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
& Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012).
66. Management Standards for Hazardous Waste Pharmaceuticals and Amendment to the
P075 Listing for Nicotine, 84 Fed. Reg. 5,816, 5,860 (Feb. 22, 2019) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.).
67. Susan Scutti, When Hospitals Pour Drugs Down the Drain, CNN (Dec. 28, 2018, 7:14 AM
EST), https://perma.cc/6RJ5-5P7T.
68. Although here we mainly focus on unrules applicable to private individuals and
businesses, we note that dispensations awarded to states and localities can still have
indirect—but no less significant—ramifications for private individuals and businesses. An
important wrinkle to acknowledge is that sometimes unrules applied to states may allow
them to impose more stringent burdens on private entities. This was the case when the
footnote continued on next page
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deadlines or even waive the application of obligations entirely. They do not
alter the underlying rule itself, but rather affect whether or how the rule’s
obligation applies to a discrete regulatory target.69
For the particular individual or entity covered by a dispensation, the need
to comply with an otherwise applicable obligation disappears, although the
obligation continues on for all other individuals or entities subject to it.
Dispensations come under numerous labels, such as “waivers,”70 “exceptions,”71
“exemptions,”72 “variances,”73 “licenses,”74 or “no-action letters,”75 but the label

69.

70.
71.

72.
73.

74.

75.

EPA granted California a waiver from the ban on state-imposed motor-vehicle-emissions
standards more stringent than federal Clean Air Act standards. See California State Motor
Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air
Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). Similarly,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has attempted to use its authority under
section 1115 of the Social Security Act to grant states waivers to impose employment
conditions and other eligibility burdens on Medicaid beneficiaries. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., Opinion Letter on Opportunities
to Promote Work and Community Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries (Jan. 11,
2018), https://perma.cc/77KR-W2KR.
We recognize, of course, that carveouts can be highly particularized too—at times
excluding from a rule’s coverage just a single entity. E.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 47 n.4 (rev. ed. 1969) (providing an example of a state law containing a highly
particularized exemption for “all” cities with a population “of more than 165,000 and less
than 166,000”). But we differentiate here that kind of carveout from a dispensation
because the former is embedded in or becomes part of the source of the rule itself.
Moreover, unless a particularized carveout expressly names a specific individual or
entity, it may be possible that in the future other entities may come to fit within the
seemingly particularized carveout, making it a generalized carveout over time. Still, the
very possibility of a highly particularized carveout that looks virtually identical to a
dispensation, save for the fact that the former is contained in the original authoritative
source of the rule (or its amendment), reinforces our point that both carveouts and
dispensations are doing the same thing—alleviating obligations—and should be
considered under a unified framework.
E.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.925(a) (2019) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission
“may waive specific requirements of the rules on its own motion or upon request”).
E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 767.251 (2020) (allowing the Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service
Agency to grant “an exception to any regulatory requirement or policy of this part” on
an “individual case basis”).
E.g., 50 C.F.R. § 660.14(d)(4) (2019) (providing that a fishing vessel may be “exempt[ ]”
from operating a “mobile transceiver unit” under certain conditions).
E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1010.4(a) (2020) (providing that the Director for the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health in the FDA “may grant a variance from one or more
provisions of any performance standard” for radiological devices).
E.g., 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(b) (2020) (providing that “[t]ransactions subject to the prohibitions
contained in this chapter, or to prohibitions the implementation and administration of
which have been otherwise delegated to the [Office of Foreign Assets Control] Director,
that are not authorized by general license may be effected only under specific license”).
E.g., Turnkey Jet, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019).
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is less important than the function of relieving a specific individual’s or entity’s
duty to comply with an existing regulation.
Examples of dispensations abound across every domain of regulatory law,
frequently in response to unusual circumstances, emergency situations, changed
conditions, or new technologies.76 To address the widespread outbreak of a novel
coronavirus in 2020, for example, the FDA issued a variety of “emergency use
authorizations” related to viral testing, treatments, and vaccines.77 The FAA has
granted waivers from its drone regulations when the agency has found that a
drone operator has proposed an alternative means of operation just as safe as the
ones specified in the rules.78 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
issued a no-action letter for a digital-coin offering under the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, promising nonenforcement of
securities laws to a company seeking to offer a new cryptocurrency.79
In many policy domains, the same statute that delegates to an administrative
agency the authority to impose regulatory obligations will also grant it the
authority to waive obligations in appropriate circumstances.80 Although
76. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.

77.

78.

79.

80.

265, 272 (2013) (“Waiver is a long-standing administrative power—and not only when
the requirement that is being waived is a regulation of the agency’s own making.”).
Waivers, or what we call dispensations (including exercises of regulatory discretion),
can alleviate statutory requirements, see generally id.; Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative
Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016), or they can alleviate regulatory requirements
previously imposed by an agency through rulemaking, see generally NIELSON, supra
note 33. This Article does not draw any fundamental distinction based on the object of
the dispensation, although agency dispensations of statutory requirements may raise
constitutional concerns that dispensations of regulations do not raise.
E.g., Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, FDA, to Robert R. Redfield, Dir.,
CDC (July 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/DM7M-SU9N (granting a request for emergency
use of a “multiplexed nucleic acid test intended for simultaneous qualitative detection
and differentiation of SARS-CoV-2” and other viral nucleic acids under 21 U.S.C.
§ 360bbb-3).
See 14 C.F.R § 107.200(a) (2020) (allowing for the grant of a waiver when drone
operation “can safely be conducted under the terms of that certificate of waiver”); see
also Part 107 Waivers, FAA, https://perma.cc/RP8P-6U8U (last updated Aug. 1, 2019,
2:14:22 PM EDT) (“These waivers allow drone pilots to deviate from certain rules
under part 107 by demonstrating they can still fly safely using alternative methods.”).
Turnkey Jet, Inc., supra note 75, 2019 WL 1471132, at *1. For general background on
the issues presented by blockchain and digital-coin offerings under the Securities Act
and Exchange Act, see generally Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff &
David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019).
E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a)(3) (“Except as provided in subsection (b)(4) or (c), the Secretary
[of Education] may waive any statutory or regulatory requirement of this chapter for
which a waiver request is submitted to the Secretary pursuant to this subsection.”); 47
U.S.C. § 613(c)(2)(C) (“The [Federal Communications] Commission may delay or waive
the regulation promulgated under subparagraph (A) to the extent the Commission
finds that the application of the regulation to live video programming delivered using
Internet protocol with captions after the effective date of such regulations would be
footnote continued on next page
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delegations of obligation-imposition power are supposed to be cabined by an
“intelligible principle” under the nondelegation doctrine,81 statutory provisions
authorizing dispensations often lack any meaningful principle at all. Sometimes
authorizations of dispensation authority sweep so broadly that they, at least
theoretically, allow agencies to waive any regulatory provision. For example,
federal statutes directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop
demonstration projects for opioid-disorder treatment provide that “[t]he
Secretary may waive any provision of this subchapter as may be necessary to
carry out the Program under this section.”82 Such is also the case with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which has decreed that “[a]ny” provision in
the Commission’s regulations “may be waived by the Commission on its own
motion or on petition if good cause therefor is shown.”83
In exercising their dispensation authority, agencies sometimes expect
recipients of dispensations to have applied or petitioned for obligation
alleviation.84 Yet it is also possible for an agency to act of its own accord to
dispense with a requirement for a specific entity by simply not enforcing it.85
Agencies need no special statutory authorization for decisions not to enforce
obligations against specific individuals or entities, as the Supreme Court has
treated that authority as an inherently discretionary administrative power.86

81.
82.
83.

84.

85.
86.

economically burdensome to providers of video programming or program owners.”);
49 U.S.C. § 31315(b)(1) (“Upon receipt of a request pursuant to this subsection, the
Secretary of Transportation may grant to a person or class of persons an exemption
from a regulation prescribed under this chapter or section 31136 if the Secretary finds
such exemption would likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater
than, the level that would be achieved absent such exemption.”).
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-6(i).
47 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2019); see also Ne. Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (“The FCC may exercise its discretion to waive a rule where particular facts
would make strict compliance inconsistent with the public interest. However, . . . those
waivers must be founded upon an ‘appropriate general standard’ . . . ‘best expressed in a
rule that obviates discriminatory approaches.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting WAIT
Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969))).
For instance, oil and gas pipeline operators can apply for “special permits” from the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration that waive or modify the usual
pipeline safety requirements. Special Permits and State Waivers Overview, PIPELINE &
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://perma.cc/YE5HSN5F (last updated Nov. 6, 2020). Likewise, firms that make small public offerings of
stock can be exempt from normal SEC registration requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251
(2020); see also, e.g., Waivers of Disqualification Under Regulation A and Rules 505 and 506 of
Regulation D, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, https://perma.cc/CPD7-GPUP (last updated Mar. 13,
2015) (granting waivers of disqualification from certain exemptions).
NIELSON, supra note 33, at 5.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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Dispensations thus take the form of individualized nonenforcement
decisions that agency officials make every day in the exercise of their
prosecutorial discretion.87 The exercise of such discretion fails to provide
regulated targets with any written assurance that the government will
continue to turn a blind eye to noncompliance. But as a practical matter, it may
be enough to function just as any other kind of dispensation. Such
dispensations can work to relieve particular individuals or entities of their felt
obligations to behave in compliance with otherwise applicable law.88
When government agencies affirmatively announce that they will forgo
enforcement of rules on an across-the-board basis against certain classes of
regulated targets or for certain periods of time, rather than on a case-by-case
basis, their decisions begin to blur the boundary between dispensations and
carveouts.89 The Obama Administration, for instance, heavily publicized its
across-the-board decision to refrain from enforcing the Controlled Substances
Act and associated regulations when states decriminalized or legalized
recreational cannabis.90 Through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
program, that same administration also declined to enforce immigration laws
against noncitizens who were brought to the United States as children.91
Similar across-the-board nonenforcement policies were announced during the
Trump Administration.92 For instance, after failing to win congressional
support to repeal the Affordable Care Act, the Trump Administration simply
abandoned its enforcement of the law’s mandate that individuals purchase
87. See Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement

88.

89.

90.
91.

92.

Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1923 (2016) (“There
are literally hundreds, if not thousands, of nonenforcement decisions of one kind or
another made by executive officials and line agents every single day.”). See generally
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)
(discussing the extensive adjudicatory discretion exercised by administrative agencies).
For the now-canonical discussion of regulators’ strategic deployment of such
enforcement discretion, see generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
Elsewhere, one of us has characterized such nonenforcement policies as an executive
power to defer—or the use of “inaction as a lever to achieve policy outcomes.” Cary
Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, Symposium Introduction, The Bounds of Executive
Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2016).
Bradley E. Markano, Note, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive
Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2015).
Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783, 791
(2013).
See Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s
Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14 (2018) (“[A]gencies across the federal
government have delayed the effective dates, and in some cases the compliance dates, of
dozens of final rules.” (footnote omitted)).
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health insurance.93 In the opening months of the COVID-19 crisis and its
concomitant economic disruption, the Administration announced that it was
temporarily suspending enforcement across the board for a range of
environmental regulatory obligations.94
The announcement of policies like these, which grant a general pass from
enforcement, even if only for a specific group of regulated entities or for a
limited time period, are similar to carveouts in that they apply categorically
rather than on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, these nonenforcement
policies are like dispensations in that they apply after a rule’s adoption and do
not explicitly amend it. Despite not expressly and formally lifting a legal
obligation, as most carveouts do, they do effectively alleviate the obligation,
putting regulated targets in the same basic position as if the rule itself had been
officially changed. As one observer of regulatory policy has commented, “[y]ou
can make a rule, but if you don’t enforce the rule, it’s almost like the rule
doesn’t exist.”95
B. The Risks of Unrules
Whatever their particular manifestations, carveouts and dispensations
both serve to alleviate obligations—and both are often needed to make rules
more effective, efficient, and fair. Rules, after all, are generalizations, and the
assumptions and preconditions underlying these generalizations do not
always fit the complex and dynamic world to which rules are applied.96
Unrules thus help rules accommodate the world in ways that can help the
law better fulfill the underlying purposes that motivate the imposition of
obligations in the first place.
In addition, because rules often aim to serve multiple purposes, it can be
necessary to tailor them in ways that balance different values. Sometimes this
means that rules must be fine-tuned or adjusted—such as when the federal
93. Haeyoun Park & Margot Sanger-Katz, 4 Ways Trump Is Weakening Obamacare, Even

After Repeal Plan’s Failure, N.Y. TIMES (updated Sept. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z8XYY6EF (“While Mr. Trump cannot eliminate the mandate, as Republicans in Congress
sought to do, the Internal Revenue Service has said it will continue accepting tax
returns that do not say whether a filer has been uninsured, weakening its enforcement
of the provision.”).
94. Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Adm’r for Enf ’t & Compliance
Assurance, EPA, to All Governmental & Private Sector Partners (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7CRJ-QD48.
95. See Brittany Knotts, Grace Tatter & Anthony Brooks, Environmental Regulations Are
Being Rolled Back. In a Pandemic, What Does That Mean for Public Health?, WBUR: ON
POINT (updated July 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/9DLU-UDPH (quoting reporter Kendra
Pierre-Louis).
96. See generally Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Regulation by Generalization, 1
REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 68 (2007); Muchmore, supra note 42.
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government amended child-resistant-packaging rules to make sure that bottles
of medicine and household cleaners designed to meet these rules could still be
opened by adults.97 Unrules can help in balancing different objectives. When
the FCC granted Google a waiver allowing a radar-based motion sensor to
operate at higher power levels than normally allowed by rules designed to
protect against interference to other users of radio spectrum, it did so in part to
“help people with mobility, speech, or tactile impairments” by enabling them
to control devices such as smart phones remotely through “touchless hand
gesture[]” technology.98
Carveouts or dispensations can also play a role in reconciling competing
policy preferences. They can make operational what Cass Sunstein has called
the incompletely theorized agreements that often underlie the law’s response
to contentious issues.99 To pick a stark example, laws restricting access to
abortions have usually contained various exceptions for when a woman’s life
or health is at risk or when pregnancy results from sexual assault—carveouts
that recognize a broad societal consensus around the alleviation of legal
restrictions on abortions.100 The use of unrules to effectuate compromises in
values can also be found in other, less controversial laws.
In these various ways, unrules can be essential for any system of rules to
implement value tradeoffs as well as to fit varied and changing political, social,
and economic circumstances.101 Unrules can provide much-needed flexibility
97. See Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM

525, 555-56 (2017).
98. Rita Liao, FCC Greenlights Soli, Google’s Radar-Based Gesture Tech, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 2,

2019, 7:30 AM CST), https://perma.cc/F8LW-DL95 (quoting the FCC). The FCC
granted Google this waiver only after determining that the Soli sensors would pose
“minimal potential of causing harmful interference to other spectrum users.” Id.
(quoting the FCC).
99. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1735 (1995). The flexibility provided by unrules may in some cases render it less
necessary for agencies to promulgate new regulations. Perhaps the ubiquity of unrules
that we document in Part II below helps to explain why regulatory provisions are not
amended more frequently. See DANIEL BYLER, BETH FLORES & JASON LEWRIS, DELOITTE
CTR. FOR GOV’T INSIGHTS, USING ADVANCED ANALYTICS TO DRIVE REGULATORY
REFORM: UNDERSTANDING PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS ON REGULATION REFORM 6 (2017),
https://perma.cc/DK3V-4ZWQ (finding that around two-thirds of sections of the CFR
have never been updated). But see Wagner et al., supra note 59, at 202 (noting that
nearly three-quarters of the rules examined by the authors “were revised by the agency
at least once and typically multiple times”).
100. See States with Laws Still on the Books That Would Ban Abortion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 12,
2018), https://perma.cc/7XVM-M7KP; Law and Policy Guide: Rape and Incest Exceptions,
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., https://perma.cc/R3TG-VSDD (archived Dec. 30, 2020).
101. See Rossi, supra note 32, at 1363 (noting that the possibility of waiving requirements
“allows agencies to adapt regulation to contemporary technological and financial
circumstances”); Aaron L. Nielson & Jennifer Nou, Opinion, How Agencies Should Use
footnote continued on next page
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to minimize unnecessary burdens on regulated entities and undesirable side
effects,102 to encourage and manage technological innovation,103 and to enable
regulators to conserve their limited resources.104 They may also at times
render regulation fairer and more equitable. Sometimes full compliance with a
rule would be infeasible or disproportionately costly for certain regulated
parties.105 If a rule is imposed rigidly and uniformly under all circumstances in
which it applies, even when the regulated parties attempt in good faith to
comply with the rule but are unable to do so fully, it may undermine the
regulation’s legitimacy106 and thereby impede compliance.107
But unrules can also be misused. Perhaps it is because of the positive role that
unrules can play in reducing costs and avoiding counterproductive effects that
their risks have not received more attention by legal scholars. Yet we should
have no illusions about unrules; they are not an unalloyed good. On the contrary,
if used unthinkingly or injudiciously, unrules can undermine the purpose of a
regulation or advantage special interests over the broader public good. They can
even introduce into a regulatory system a source of arbitrariness that is
antithetical to the rule of law. We highlight below three major risks posed by
unrules and offer prominent examples to illustrate each.

102.

103.

104.
105.
106.

107.

Waivers and Exemptions, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/V8T8-PZ3M
(noting that “agencies often need to grant flexibility when circumstances require,” such
as in emergencies or in connection with new technologies).
See Aman, supra note 32, at 294-313 (describing several different types of “hardship
exceptions” and “fairness exceptions”); see also Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed.
Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017) (“The authority to waive or exempt regulated parties
from specific legal requirements affords agencies much-needed flexibility to respond to
situations in which generally applicable laws are a poor fit for a given situation.”).
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 447
(2017) (explaining how the FDA’s decision to exempt laboratory-developed tests from its
medical-device regime “demonstrates the rapid innovation—but also the quality
problems—that can result from such a policy”). But see Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory
Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 581 (2019) (expressing skepticism about the
promotion of innovation as a regulatory goal and arguing that the best reason to advance
a regulatory sandbox is to cope with—rather than promote—financial innovation).
NIELSON, supra note 33, at 2.
See Aman, supra note 32, at 303; Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728,
61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017).
See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (warning of backlash by regulated firms
when rules are applied unwaveringly by the book).
Rodney L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental
Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2004) (“[A] rule is more likely to be undercut
if it does not in some way take into account considerations of hardship, equity, or more
effective implementation of overall policy, considerations that an agency cannot
realistically ignore, at least on a continuing basis.” (quoting WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418
F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969))).
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1.

Negating regulatory benefits

Although unrules can sometimes reduce regulatory costs,108 in doing so they
also may diminish regulatory benefits.109 This prospect may be more likely than
we realize, as policymakers rarely realize unrules’ full consequences at the time
they are created.110 Indeed, such consequences may not materialize until years
later, after regulated entities figure out how to restructure their activities to fall
into a category that escapes a rule’s obligations. Human decisionmaking, after all,
tends to be myopic.111 When regulators are faced with a seemingly sympathetic
case for a dispensation or for carving out a particular line of business from a rule,
the short-term payoffs of such obligation alleviation will tend to loom larger
than the long-term consequences.
This myopic tendency can be exacerbated by a political economy that
ensures that individuals or businesses petitioning for obligation alleviation
will be better mobilized than those who lose from such alleviation.112 This
political economy helps explain the common practice of grandfathering
existing businesses out of regulatory obligations. Yet the long-term negative
consequences of carving out exceptions for existing firms can be substantial.
For example, the Clean Air Act’s pollution carveout for existing plants has
encouraged owners to focus on extending their plants’ lives rather than
building new plants that would be inherently cleaner.113
108. See, e.g., Richard Seig, Retail Compliance Ctr., Little-Known Hazardous Waste Exceptions

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

Can Significantly Reduce Regulatory Burdens, MEDIUM (updated Jan. 2, 2018),
https://perma.cc/J6XA-XDAX.
See, e.g., Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017)
(noting that waiving or exempting parties from compliance with regulations may
impact the “protection of the public”); Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 1222
(“Excessive reliance on back-end adjustments can water down a rule to the point that it
is far less effective in protecting the public or the environment than it would be if
implemented as designed and without adjustments.”).
One example of unforeseen consequences is the invasion of zebra mussels in the Great
Lakes that resulted after EPA regulators carved out inland bodies of water from
pollution requirements, leading to discharges of ballast water containing the mussels.
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
See ROBERT MEYER & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, THE OSTRICH PARADOX: WHY WE
UNDERPREPARE FOR DISASTERS 13-19 (2017); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOW 137-38 (2011).
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (“When the benefits of a prospective policy are
concentrated but the costs widely distributed, client politics is likely to result. Some
small, easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to
organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per capita rate over
a large number of people, and hence they have little incentive to organize in
opposition—if, indeed, they even hear of the policy.”); see also infra Part III.C.
RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR
ON COAL” 3-4 (2016).
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One need not look far to find other instances where unrules have
substantially undermined regulatory benefits. The Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA), for example, has long carved out silica dust from
direct regulation in its rules designed to control inhalation of harmful
substances in mining operations, even though exposure to silica has been
linked to progressive massive fibrosis among coal miners.114 Under the
Obama Administration, MSHA tried to close other mine-dust loopholes,115
but it still failed to issue any separate standard to address exposure to
respirable silica, leaving workers still exposed to hazards from breathing
silica dust.116
Consider further that exemptions from rules governing blowout
preventers on deepwater oil rigs appear to have contributed to the 2007
Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. One
postaccident report noted that “it had become routine for [federal agency
officials] to grant certain specific exemptions from regulatory requirements,
mostly related to blowout preventer (BOP) testing, in order to accommodate
the needs of deepwater operations.”117 Indeed, just days before the accident, the
Minerals Management Service had approved exemptions from otherwise
required protocols.118 Notwithstanding major legal and institutional reforms
implemented after the oil spill to prevent a future catastrophe, a decade later
114. See Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous

115.

116.
117.

118.

Personal Dust Monitors, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,814, 24,817 (May 1, 2014) (to be codified at 30
C.F.R. pts. 70-72, 75, 90) (noting that although there has been a respirable dust standard
on the books since 1980, “[t]here is no separate standard for respirable silica”); Kirsten S.
Almberg, Cara N. Halldin, David J. Blackley, A. Scott Laney, Eileen Storey, Cecile S.
Rose, Leonard H.T. Go & Robert A. Cohen, Progressive Massive Fibrosis Resurgence
Identified in U.S. Coal Miners Filing for Black Lung Benefits, 1970-2016, 15 ANNALS AM.
THORACIC SOC’Y 1420, 1424-25 (2018) (showing the consequences of worker exposure to
silica dust); Howard Berkes, Huo Jingnan & Robert Benincasa, Investigation, An
Epidemic Is Killing Thousands of Coal Miners. Regulators Could Have Stopped It, NPR: ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED (Dec. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM ET), https://perma.cc/7LBA-N79P. An
estimated 100 workers in the United States die from silicosis every year. See Michael
Sainato, “It’s Really Tragic”: Why Are Coalminers Still Dying from Black Lung Disease?,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2020, 3:00 AM EST), https://perma.cc/SX69-98WP.
For example, the old rules required air sampling for only an eight-hour period—even if
workers had longer than an eight-hour shift. Mine Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, Fact Sheet: MSHA’s Final Rule to Lower Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal
Mine Dust (2014), https://perma.cc/NL4U-8WGS. In addition, companies could
apparently conduct certain dust samples on days when production was at low levels
(and thus dust levels were low too)—whereas the Respirable Dust Rule requires the
samples “when mines are operating at 80 percent of production or more.” Id.
See id.
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
MACONDO: THE GULF OIL DISASTER—CHIEF COUNSEL’S REPORT 253 (2011),
https://perma.cc/W8RB-MAXC.
Id. at 258-59.
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the Trump Administration resumed the practice of issuing exemptions for
deepwater-drilling-safety rules, reportedly issuing nearly 1,700 waivers from
key requirements (including blowout-preventer rules).119
2.

Regulatory favoritism

When regulatory agencies dole out dispensations or carve out firms from
the scope of important rules, they might be acting at the behest of interest groups
seeking undue favors and at the expense of the general public.120 From a firm’s
perspective, the ideal situation is often to have a general rule put in place that
obligates its competitors but that exempts it from those requirements. We know,
for example, that industry lobbyists will at times try to persuade regulators to
write rules that disadvantage their competitors while leaving their own firms
subject to fewer or less stringent obligations.121 Carveouts and dispensations
provide an excellent vehicle for ensuring favorable treatment. As we discuss
more fully in Part III, unrules in general tend to receive less stringent oversight
by the courts, and some dispensations escape altogether the open procedures and
reporting requirements that apply to the rulemaking process.
Undue business influence appears to have played a key role, for example, in
the issuance of dispensations to refineries during the first few years of the
Trump Administration. In 2018, the EPA granted a “financial hardship waiver”
to a large oil refinery owned by the billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who had
served as an early advisor to President Trump on regulatory matters.122 In that
capacity, Icahn had reportedly tried—but failed—to see that the EPA amend a
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requirement that his company CVR Energy
purchase renewable fuel credits, which were costing the firm hundreds of
millions of dollars.123 From Icahn’s perspective, getting a waiver from the RFS
may have represented a similarly attractive option: From August 2017, when he
119. Ben Lefebvre, Exclusive: Interior Hands Out Hundreds of Offshore Drilling Safety Rule
120.

121.

122.

123.

Waivers, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2019, 2:55 PM EST), https://perma.cc/3MTP-6ARH.
See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (reviewing the
literature on regulatory capture); Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, George J.
Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLASSICS IN
PUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 287 (Steven J. Balla, Martin Lodge & Edward C.
Page eds., 2015) (same).
Recent empirical research indicates that businesses can influence the design of
regulations. See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006).
Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Exclusive: U.S. EPA Grants Biofuels Waiver to Billionaire
Icahn’s Oil Refinery—Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2018, 6:03 AM), https://perma.cc/2M36DLYA.
See Patrick Radden Keefe, Carl Icahn’s Failed Raid on Washington, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/U7ZP-6QV2.
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resigned from his special advisor position, to May 2018, shortly after news
surfaced that CVR Energy had received a hardship waiver, his firm’s stock price
more than doubled, resulting in a reported $1.4 billion gain for Icahn.124 Notably,
the EPA took its action under a statutory provision giving it authority to grant
waivers to “small refiner[ies]” that demonstrate that they would otherwise suffer
“disproportionate economic hardship.”125 The EPA gave a dispensation to Icahn’s
refinery and to those of other companies even though their size was anything
but small.126
Such undue business influence over regulatory decisions during the Trump
Administration may have also been enabled by a different kind of dispensation:
waivers of government ethics rules. Erik Baptist, a lawyer who worked in the
Trump Administration in the same EPA program office responsible for the RFS,
previously served as a lobbyist and lawyer for a trade association for the oil and
gas industry. In that capacity, Baptist had lobbied Congress to repeal the RFS. In
2017, before the EPA had issued a waiver to Icahn, White House counsel Don
McGahn reportedly gave Baptist an ethics waiver that allowed him to work on
renewable-fuel regulatory issues for the EPA.127 According to a 2018 news
report, at least thirty-seven Trump Administration officials—including several
former industry lobbyists—received official ethics waivers from the White
House Counsel in the early years of the Administration, allowing those former
lobbyists to work on issues that directly affected their previous employers in the
private sector.128
124. Tom DiChristopher, Carl Icahn’s Refinery Investment Has Rebounded by $1.4 Billion,

125.
126.

127.

128.

Boosted by Trump Energy Policy, CNBC (May 4, 2018, 12:10 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/
X9HU-72HE.
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i); see also Renshaw & Prentice, supra note 122.
See DiChristopher, supra note 124 (noting that CVR Refining, the entity that manages
CVR Energy’s refining assets, posted nearly $147 million in profits in the first quarter
of 2018). For a related concern that in the financial sector the SEC tends to waive
various disqualification rules for large firms, see Kara M. Stein, Dissenting Statement in
the Matter of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, plc, Regarding Order Under Rule 405 of the
Securities Act of 1933, Granting a Waiver from Being an Ineligible Issuer, SEC (Apr. 28,
2014), https://perma.cc/39EX-B3GT (dissenting from Royal Bank of Scotland Group,
plc, Securities Act Release No. 9578, Exchange Act Release No. 72032 (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://perma.cc/83JQ-Q229) (“[T]he Commission routinely waives [disqualification
rules]. . . . Are [such waivers] being fairly applied to all firms and individuals? Large
institutions should be treated no differently, neither better nor worse, than small and
medium-sized issuers.”).
Michael Biesecker, Juliet Linderman & Richard Lardner, What Swamp? Lobbyists Get Ethics
Waivers to Work for Trump, AP NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/8D46-PBBE; Laura
Peterson, Ryan Zinke’s Interior Department Gives Law-Breaking Coal Company a Pass, DAILY
BEAST (June 25, 2018, 5:04 AM ET), https://perma.cc/CVA3-X3AP (chronicling insider
meetings that led to the Department of the Interior granting an enforcement
dispensation to a mining company charged with regulatory violations).
Biesecker et al., supra note 127.
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Undue business influence over dispensations has not been limited to the EPA.
When defense contractor Raytheon saw sales of its missile systems to Saudi
Arabia stymied by congressional opposition, it found a lobbyist with close ties to
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.129 That lobbyist was able to arrange a meeting
between Raytheon officials and Secretary Pompeo—and, a few weeks later, the
State Department took the highly unusual step of invoking a waiver provision in
the Arms Export Control Act that allowed the Raytheon missile sale to proceed
without the normal lag period that would have allowed Congress to block the
sale.130 The waiver was granted under a provision in the Act that authorizes
departures from normal procedures when “an emergency exists which requires
[an arms] sale in the national security interests of the United States”131—but, of
course, nothing evincing any real emergency had ever been shown.
These are but a few examples illustrating the basic incentives behind the
politics of unrules. Just as regulatory capture can arise when highly motivated,
powerful businesses pressure government decisionmakers to adopt rules that
create barriers of entry to competitors, businesses also have incentives to seek to
use unrules to get out from under regulations and avoid the compliance costs
that other firms must bear. This is a kind of unregulatory capture.
3.

The unrule of law

When unrules “swallow the rule,”132 they can completely subvert the laws
on the books.133 In addition, if carveouts are indiscriminate and dispensations
129. Kenneth P. Vogel, Michael LaForgia & Hailey Fuchs, Trump Vowed to “Drain the

130.

131.
132.

133.

Swamp,” but Lobbyists Are Helping Run His Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (updated July 9, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ZKN6-T36D.
Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Emergency
Notification of Arms Sales to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia
(May 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/8TP4-6VB6; see also Edward Wong, Catie Edmondson
& Eric Schmitt, Trump Officials Prepare to Bypass Congress to Sell Weapons to Gulf Nations,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/C6P2-ZYGR.
22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (flush language); see also Wong et al., supra note 130.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (characterizing
the Trump Administration’s proposed exemptions from the ACA’s contraceptive
coverage mandate as “the proverbial exception that swallows the rule”), aff’d sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom. Little Sisters of
the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); see also
Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 958 (2018) (“In
crafting religious accommodations, legislatures and courts take as a fundamental
premise that accommodation does not defeat the purpose of the law.”).
See FULLER, supra note 69, at 39. Others have recognized this risk with regulatory
exemptions—or what we call dispensations. Aman, supra note 32, at 292 (“[I]f exceptions
to rules are freely and easily granted, with little or no regard for principle, the ‘inner
morality of law’ may be jeopardized. . . . [A]n arbitrary exceptions regime would be
characterized not by too much law, but by no law at all.” (quoting FULLER, supra note 69,
footnote continued on next page
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frequent and undisclosed, the law may no longer come to provide the
predictability, notice, and fairness that it needs to operate effectively. When
abused, unrules can turn regulation into little more than politics by other
means.134 In some cases, unrules might even become tools of “administrative
sabotage” for opponents of regulatory programs.135
During the Trump Administration, the potential threats to the rule of law
posed by unrules grew particularly salient. For example, shortly after taking
office, President Trump signed Executive Order 13,765, which directed
relevant agencies to “waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the
implementation of any provision or requirement” contained in the ACA.136
President Trump’s order urged administrators to use unrules in an effort to
undermine a statute that the President wanted to repeal in Congress but could
not. One result of that and subsequent Trump executive orders was the
widening of an ACA carveout that allows short-term health insurance plans to
exclude people with preexisting conditions or charge them higher premiums
based on their health status.137 By redefining short-term health plans to allow
more plans to qualify for exemption from otherwise applicable prohibitions,
the Trump Administration’s actions risked that healthier individuals would

134.

135.

136.
137.

passim)); Sean D. Croston, Recent Development, An Important Member of the Family: The
Role of Regulatory Exemptions in Administrative Procedure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 295, 310 (2012)
(“[I]f a child is allowed to stay up late past bedtime on most nights, it is not a special
permission anymore—it is a new bedtime. . . . [T]he ‘parent’ agency should announce the
new bedtime as a new rule rather than simply granting permission each night.”);
Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 1222 (arguing that “once the exceptions swallow
a rule, regulatory policy becomes incoherent,” as regulated entities will not comply with
the rule when there are widespread dispensations). For a helpful discussion of rule-of-law
issues related to dispensations, see Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority:
Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 235, 250-57, 262-65 (2016).
Even those who are otherwise no great fans of regulation recognize the threat that
unrules can pose to the rule of law if regulators have too much discretion over how to
use them. See Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2011, at 39,
39-41. Under some circumstances, the prospect of unrules may even increase
regulatory burdens. Aaron Nielson has written about how waivers can be dangled in
front of private parties and used to extract concessions that regulators may not have
had the authority to compel. See generally Aaron L. Nielson, Essay, Nonenforcement and
the Danger of Leveraging, LOY. U. CHI. J. REGUL. COMPLIANCE, Fall 2018, at 19.
See David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage 34-40 (July 29, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors) (arguing that agency leaders can use basic tools of
administrative law—including nonenforcement policies and waivers—to engage in
“programmatic sabotage” to “undermine implementation of statutory policy goals”).
Exec. Order No. 13,765, 3 C.F.R. 260, 260-61 (2018), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 18001 note.
Exec. Order No. 13,813, 3 C.F.R. 387 (2018), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 18001 note; 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.701-2 (2020) (defining “short-term, limited-duration insurance”); see also Katie
Keith, Administration Moves to Liberalize Rules on Short-Term, Non-ACA-Compliant
Coverage, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/NWL3-KFTN.
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opt for the cheaper, short-term plans and leave sicker patients stuck in the
fully compliant insurance market, thus driving up premiums in contravention
of the statute’s purpose.138 City officials across the United States charged that
“[t]he Trump Administration’s actions are . . . an affront to the rule of law.”139
Nicholas Bagley and Abbe Gluck accused the President of “an unconstitutional
usurpation of power,” arguing that “[n]ever in modern American history has a
president so transparently aimed to destroy a piece of major legislation.”140
Efforts to alleviate obligations imposed on government officials pose their
own risks to the rule of law. One of the most controversial unrules of President
Trump’s first two years in office came in the aftermath of the longest
government shutdown in U.S. history: The President invoked the National
Emergencies Act to justify redirecting military appropriations to fund the
construction of a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico.141 Under the
National Emergencies Act, a presidential emergency declaration triggers up to
136 “special or extraordinary” statutory unrules,142 including one that allows
the government to “undertake military construction projects . . . not otherwise
authorized by law.”143 Because of the number and breadth of dispensations
triggered by the President’s emergency declaration, and because he used this
provision to get around a congressional rejection of a border wall, a number of
leading legal scholars argued that President Trump’s action amounted to an
unlawful abuse of presidential power.144 One conservative magazine headline
138. See Keith, supra note 137; Memorandum from Paul Spitalnic, Chief Actuary, Ctrs. for

139.
140.
141.
142.

143.
144.

Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Estimated Financial Effects of the Short-Term, LimitedDuration Policy Proposed Rule (Apr. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/53AX-ZCHF.
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, City of Columbus v.
Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 770 (D. Md. 2020) (No. 18-cv-2364), 2019 WL 2118179, ECF No. 44.
Nicholas Bagley & Abbe R. Gluck, Opinion, Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare Is Illegal, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/98VJ-4QKV.
Proclamation No. 9,844, 3 C.F.R. 12, 13 (2020), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1621 note (Supp. I
2020).
50 U.S.C. § 1621(a); A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://perma.cc/5XD8-FTQW (last updated Apr. 24, 2020) (identifying 136 statutory
powers that “may become available to the president upon declaration of a national
emergency”); see also Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency
Powers, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://perma.cc/M5C8-SSDM. In July 2019, the
Supreme Court granted the Trump Administration’s request for a stay of a district
court’s permanent injunction against the government’s action to redirect funds under
the President’s emergency declaration, allowing construction of the border wall to
move forward pending appeal. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.),
motion to lift stay denied mem., 140 S. Ct. 2620 (2020).
10 U.S.C. § 2808(a). These are unrules directed at the government: They waive certain
obligations with which the government would otherwise have had to comply.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, No, Trump Cannot Declare an “Emergency” to Build His Wall,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/245N-MABV. But see Samuel Estreicher &
David Moosmann, President Trump’s Emergency Wall Declaration: A Guide to the Legal
footnote continued on next page
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declared the President’s emergency declaration to be simply “contemptuous of
the rule of law.”145
* * *
In sum, although the responsible use of unrules can play a positive—even
necessary—role in regulatory law, the misuse of unrules can also undermine
the rule of law, create incentives for undue influence by interest groups, and
reduce the benefits that regulations have been created to produce. These
concerns might be easy to overlook if unrules were only an exceptional or
infrequent part of the regulatory system, or if administrative discretion to use
unrules were sufficiently constrained by adequate procedures and oversight.
But, as we show in the next Part of this Article, unrules are ubiquitous. This
ubiquity, combined with the distinctive risks that unrules pose, make all the
more troubling what we show in Part III—that current law tends to leave
agencies’ power to alleviate obligations less constrained than their power to
impose them.
II. The Ubiquity of Unrules
Once we become alert to them, important unrules can be found lurking
behind nearly every major issue affecting law and society as well as in the
mundane details of everyday life: President Trump’s so-called Muslim travel
ban,146 the viral spread of political propaganda on social media,147 access to
insurance coverage for contraceptive care,148 investment funds in securities

145.
146.

147.

148.

Issues, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Mar. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/9CV2-RB5P (arguing that “the
president appears, at minimum, to have a credible statutory argument both on the
authorization of the construction projects and on some of the identified sources of
funding”).
David French, Trump’s Emergency Declaration Is Contemptuous of the Rule of Law, NAT’L
REV. (Feb. 15, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://perma.cc/WN3A-NG5X (capitalization altered).
The Supreme Court relied in part on the existence of “case-by-case waivers when a
foreign national demonstrates undue hardship” in upholding the Trump
Administration’s travel ban. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018).
In 2006, the Federal Election Commission created carveouts in the definitions of
“contribution” and “expenditure” that eliminated campaign-finance regulation of
Internet political activity. See Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589, 18,590
(Apr. 12, 2006) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110, 114).
The Trump Administration issued rules dramatically expanding moral and religious
exemptions from the ACA’s requirement to cover contraceptive care. See Religious
Exemptions, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). The Supreme
Court upheld these exemptions in July 2020. See infra notes 208-11.
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markets,149 and even visits to the Grand Canyon150—to offer just a few
examples beyond those we have already mentioned.
That it becomes easy to identify examples of unrules itself testifies to their
ubiquity. But to demonstrate more systematically the prevalence of unrules, in
this Part we report the results of the first empirical research measuring indicia
of unrules in federal regulatory law. Employing widely accepted quantitative
methods to analyze the text of several major legal sources, we find evidence
that unrules are virtually omnipresent in regulatory law, even growing apace
with indicia of rules in recent years. The importance of these findings is
difficult to overstate.
As we will discuss further in Part III, our findings indicate that the U.S.
regulatory system has much more play in the joints than has been previously
understood. Both public discourse and academic analysis relating to regulation
tend to treat the imposition of obligations as the defining feature of the
administrative state.151 It is easy to get the impression that regulatory law is
burdensome and inflexible when one focuses only on the obligations the law
imposes. We are able to demonstrate systematically that, in reality, the
regulatory system in the United States has a tremendous amount of wiggle room
too. If scholars and practitioners are to understand the regulatory system in its
entirety, they must appreciate how much it is a system of both rules and unrules.
To be sure, language indicative of unrules—that is, obligation-alleviating
words such as may, waive, and exempt—are still outnumbered in sources of
regulatory law by words indicative of the imposition of obligations, such as
shall, must, and prohibit. But, as we explain further below, the evidence we find
for the existence of unrules almost certainly represents a lower bound on the
total obligation alleviation in regulatory law and practice. The language we
identify for potential unrules can be invoked either repeatedly to alleviate
many obligations or all at once to alleviate broad swaths of obligations with a
single stroke. Furthermore, our measures do not capture the myriad informal
ways that administrative agencies use their enforcement discretion to provide
relief from regulatory obligations.
149. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes New Approval Process for Certain Exchange-Traded

Funds, (June 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/ELS4-UZSX (acknowledging that exchangetraded funds (ETFs) are “hybrid investment products not originally provided for by the
U.S. securities laws,” but proposing a carveout so that “ETFs that satisfy certain
conditions would be able to operate within the scope of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 and to come to market without applying for individual exemptive orders”).
150. The FAA granted the Hualapai Tribe a hardship exemption from the cap on the
number of helicopter flights it can run through the Grand Canyon, leading to concerns
about excessive exhaust and noise pollution. Nick Paumgarten, Cultural Comment, The
Grand Canyon Needs to Be Saved by Every Generation, NEW YORKER (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/H7LC-4GSS.
151. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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Taken together, the evidence from our computer-assisted quantitative
methods and the many examples we have assembled show not only that unrules
are ubiquitous but that, by extension, so too is the considerable authority
agencies possess to alleviate obligations. Given the risks that obligation
alleviation can pose by negating regulatory benefits, fostering favoritism, and
undercutting the rule of law, the power to alleviate obligations deserves much
the same kind of transparency and oversight that attend agencies’ exercise of
their power to impose obligations. Yet as we explain in Part III, core features of
administrative law have tended to give obligation alleviation more of a pass than
is prudent, given the ubiquity of unrules demonstrated here.
A. Uncovering Unrules: Methods
For decades, when lawyers, politicians, and scholars have expressed
consternation over federal regulatory burdens, they have typically pointed to
the number of documents or pages in the Federal Register and other sources of
law.152 In 1946, when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
a total of 14,736 pages appeared in the Federal Register.153 By 2016, the annual
number of pages had grown to 97,069—an increase of 560% over seventy years.154
But despite the occasional claim that “the number of pages in the Federal Register
is a reasonably good proxy for overall regulatory output,”155 page counts cannot
indicate anything about the content of pages or their substantive impact,
especially the extent to which they impose obligations or alleviate them.156 For
152. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 25, at 767 (“Measured by any and every index, our law is

153.
154.
155.
156.

exploding. New statutes, regulations, and ordinances are increasing at geometric rates
at all levels of government.”); HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND
ABUSES 2 (reprt. 2015) (1977) (“Today, you can hardly turn around without bumping
into some federal restraint or requirement.”); MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW,
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION: A POLITICALLYVIABLE APPROACH TO U.S. REGULATORY REFORM 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/9P74-E2RZ
(pointing to growth in the pages in the CFR and noting that “[n]ew regulations are
constantly being added from just about every federal agency . . . [and] [n]ew regulations
simply accumulate on top of old ones”); Susan E. Dudley, Essay, Can Fiscal Budget
Concepts Improve Regulation?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 264-65 (2016) (“Despite
central oversight and requirements for public input and [benefit–cost analysis], the
growth in new regulations continues, and with it concerns that we have reached a
point of diminishing returns.” (citation omitted)).
Off. of the Fed. Reg., Federal Register Pages Published, 1936-2019 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/
RXM7-KW8Q.
Id. The annual number of pages has dropped since 2016. See id.
Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 285,
290 (2013).
Jodi L. Short, The Trouble with Counting: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting,
103 MINN. L. REV. 93, 97 (2018) (“[T]here are no good reasons to believe that counting
the number of regulations is a useful proxy for the costs or burdens of regulation.”).
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this reason, we dissect sources of regulatory law at the level of the words that
actually appear on the page.
Specifically, our main empirical methodology in this Part follows an
approach employed in recent years by other researchers who analyze linguistic
patterns in large bodies of legal text.157 Researchers at George Mason University’s
Mercatus Center, for example, have used similar techniques to estimate what they
call regulatory “restrictions”—or, more precisely, obligations—by counting key
words in regulatory texts.158 The Mercatus Center researchers have developed a
quantitative dataset they call RegData, which essentially contains the results of
computerized word searches that quantify the number of obligation-related terms
used in regulations: shall, must, may not, prohibited, and required.159 They have used
their results, which show a nearly 20% increase in obligation-related words since
1997, to caution against adding further regulation, claiming that “regulatory
accumulation will continue to stifle economic growth.”160
But the Mercatus Center data do not account for unrules. We have thus
replicated the methods underlying RegData and also adapted and expanded
157. Methods of quantitative text analysis have emerged as a central analytical tool in the

social sciences. See Justin Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise
and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL. ANALYSIS
267 (2013); Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver & Slava Mikhaylov, Workshop, Treating
Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions, 53 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 495 (2009). For examples of legal scholarship employing these methods, see
LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (Michael A.
Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019); Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation
False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effects on Agency Rules, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 85
(2019); Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy,
106 CALIF. L. REV. 1529 (2018); David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV.
153 (2016); and Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).
158. See Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 112; see also Bentley Coffey, Patrick A.
McLaughlin & Pietro Peretto, The Cumulative Cost of Regulations, 38 REV. ECON.
DYNAMICS 1, 4 (2020). We will use the more clinical word “obligations” because that is
what these words impose. Whether they in fact restrict anyone’s behavior will be
contingent on what obligatees separately wish to do. For example, a person may well
have a legal obligation to shovel the walkway in front of her house in the winter, but if
she would already shovel it anyway for her own convenience or just because she
wishes to be neighborly, she will not be in any way restricted.
159. RegData US Technical Documentation, QUANTGOV, https://perma.cc/DJP2-56QS (last
updated Mar. 23, 2020) (measuring the number of occurrences of these words and
phrases in each Part of the CFR from 1970 to 2019); Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra
note 28, at 112. In addition, the authors use machine-learning text-classification
algorithms to predict which industry is primarily affected by each obligation-imposing
term. Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 114-17 (describing the methodology
used to generate “industry relevance” measures).
160. PATRICK A. MCLAUGHLIN, NITA GHEI & MICHAEL WILT, MERCATUS CTR., POLICY BRIEF:
REGULATORY ACCUMULATION AND ITS COSTS—AN OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/
G5HQ-WK87.
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them to the task of measuring unrules based on a dictionary of five comparable
obligation-alleviating terms: waive, exclude, except, exempt, and variance.161 We
used computerized computational techniques to search for both obligationimposing and obligation-alleviating terms throughout the Federal Register and
the CFR, as well as in the United States Code. In our searches, we used both
inflected and derived forms of the ten dictionary search terms. For instance,
for the word waive, we searched for waive(s), waiving, waived, and waiver(s). We
did the same for all of the obligation-alleviating and obligation-imposing
words and phrases in our dictionaries.162 We also separately conducted
validation testing based on a random sample of our dictionary words in
context, in which two law-trained coders confirmed that the words were
actually being used in a manner consistent with expectations—namely, to
impose or alleviate legal obligations.163
The Appendix provides examples of regulatory provisions in the CFR that
feature one or more of the obligation-alleviating terms used in our analysis.
These examples show how the terms in our unrule dictionary are commonly
used to limit, lessen, or eliminate regulatory obligations, either by carving out
161. These were, of course, not the only words that might be used to alleviate regulatory

obligations—just as the five words in the Mercatus Center dictionary are not the only
ones that could be used to impose obligations. Indeed, we brainstormed nineteen
possible obligation-alleviating terms before settling on the five terms we used. We
wanted a dictionary comparable in size and character to the RegData dictionary and
settled on the five terms we did because they seemed the most intuitively related to the
lifting of obligations. Other words and phrases we considered were grandfather, not
apply, not include, applies only to, limited to, shall not apply, except small business, need not
comply, forbearance, only if, permission, suspend, permit, and allow. Our choices about
which words to use in the unrules dictionary were not based on the frequency with
which they appear in regulatory texts. Indeed, we were surprised that one word in our
unrule dictionary—variance—is relatively infrequently used in federal regulatory texts.
Rather, we aimed for words that we thought would be cleaner and more precise in
their meaning. For example, we did not use permit because even though its verb form
could connote obligation alleviation, its noun form seemed more associated with the
imposition of obligations. For a description of our efforts to validate empirically that
the words chosen capture the distinction between obligation alleviation and obligation
imposition, see note 163 below.
162. The Appendix shows, with added italics, the inflected and derived forms of the
words in our unrules dictionary. Our obligation-imposing dictionary included
similar sets of variants.
163. We randomly sampled 75 examples of obligation-imposing words and 75 examples of
obligation-alleviating words from the CFR, then captured 500 words before and after
each sampled word. The coders found that 95% of the words used in context matched
the expected meaning. When asked about the clarity of meaning, the coders agreed
that 115 out of the 150 words were either “clear” or “very clear” from the context. Of
these 115 instances, the coders agreed on the regulatory effect of the words in 112 of the
instances, which in those instances lined up exactly as expected. In short, we were able
to validate that the words contained in our dictionary do meaningfully capture
obligation imposition and alleviation.
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specified activities or actors from the scope of a general rule or by authorizing
or establishing procedures for regulated entities to obtain dispensations. With
our dictionary of unrule-related terms thus defined, we then used a package in
the statistical software R called quanteda164 to compute summary statistics
about the frequency of each term in our dictionary in a variety of sources of
regulatory text: the Federal Register, the CFR, and the United States Code.
B. Unrules in the Federal Register
We begin with the Federal Register because it has been the source most
widely cited to support conventional wisdom about the growth of obligation
imposition in the United States. Agencies are required to publish each new
regulation in the Federal Register before it can go into effect.165 Yet unrules
can also be embedded in these agency regulations. For instance, in a
document labeled as a “final rule,” the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) in 2015 established “public company waivers” that would “exempt
about 94 percent of plans and sponsors from many reporting requirements
and result in a net reduction in reporting to PBGC,” all in an explicit effort to
“reduce unnecessary reporting requirements, while at the same time better
targeting PBGC’s resources to plans that pose the greatest risks to the
pension insurance system.”166
Figure 1.A presents annual counts for our five obligation-alleviating
terms in the Federal Register from 1936 to 2016. The number has been
trending upward since 1990 (after a steep decline in the 1980s) and has seen
sharper upticks since 2010. To put these alleviating terms into some further
context, we can look at the most recent year in the data, 2016, where there
were 146,894 occurrences of alleviating terms. By comparison, in that same
year there were 746,742 occurrences of obligation-imposing terms. Clearly,
obligation-imposing terms do outnumber obligation-alleviating terms in the
Federal Register. But the ratio of one obligation-alleviating term to every 5.1
obligation-imposing terms suggests that unrule-related terms are a substantial,
if not integral, part of the corpus of regulation. Indeed, as Figure 1.B shows,
the ratio of alleviating to imposing terms has been increasing over time, at
times spiking to one alleviating term per 3.5 imposing terms.
To compare obligation imposition and alleviation further using the Federal
Register, we used Lexis’s comprehensive Federal Register library to search only
164. QUANTEDA, https://perma.cc/ZRZ6-3VD6 (archived Dec. 30, 2020).
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d); see also MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43056, COUNTING

REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND
PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 14 (2013), https://perma.cc/TZD7-LHYU.
166. Reportable Events and Certain Other Notification Requirements, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,980,
54,980 (Sept. 11, 2015) (to be codified in scattered parts of 29 C.F.R.).
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Figure 1.A
Obligation-Alleviating Terms in the Federal Register (1936-2016)

in the “action” field within each document—a field that agencies use to
designate the kind of action they are taking. For the period from 1979 to 2016,
we conducted a simple search looking for documents with one of two obligationalleviating words—waiver or exemption—in this field.167 Much as agencies use the
labels “proposed rule” and “final rule” when promulgating regulations in the
Federal Register, they also sometimes publish notices of waivers and exemptions
with corresponding labels when issuing dispensations. For instance, the
Employee Benefits Security Administration in the Department of Labor entered
167. Specifically, our search terms were action (exempt! or waiv!) and date ([year]). We also

searched for final-rule and proposed-rule documents in order to assess the relative
balance of these different types of actions.

924

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

Figure 1.B
Ratio of Obligation-Alleviating Terms to
Obligation-Imposing Terms in the Federal Register (1936-2016)

“Grant of individual exemptions” in the action field of a Federal Register
document that granted a Deutsche Bank subsidiary a dispensation from certain
obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.168
Even though agencies are seldom required to publish notices of dispensations in
the Federal Register,169 we found an average of 567 waivers or exemptions per
year designated as such in the action field of the Federal Register. Comparing these
168. Exemptions from Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,028,

94,028 (Dec. 22, 2016).
169. See infra Table 3.
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notices of unrules to notices of final rules, we found one reported dispensation
for every six published rules—keeping in mind, as the PBGC example above
indicates, that what an agency issues as a final rule can also contain unrules.
To gain additional perspective on the extent to which final rule documents
in the Federal Register create or authorize unrules, we also examined the
document titles that agencies gave to their entries in the Federal Register. As
with the PBGC example, some documents designated as “final rule” in the
action field nevertheless principally created exemptions or established
procedures for agencies to grant dispensations. For instance, a 2018 FAA
document designated as a “final rule” was entitled “Updates to Rulemaking and
Waiver Procedures and Expansion of the Equivalent Level of Safety
Option.”170 This “rule” gave commercial space carriers the opportunity to
request waivers if they showed they could meet levels of safety equivalent to
those that compliance with the rules would provide.171 As a rough gauge of the
extent of final rule documents like these examples from the PBGC and FAA
that have at least as much to do with obligation alleviation as with obligation
imposition, we used another source of Federal Register data to search the titles
of each final rule from 1996 to 2017.172 Strikingly, given the common
perception that agencies’ final rules primarily or even exclusively impose
obligations, the term exempt made up a slightly higher proportion of all words
in final rule titles during that period than did require.173 Indeed, obligationalleviating terms were somewhat more frequent overall than obligationimposing terms in the titles of agencies’ rule documents.174
By now, it should be clear that the Federal Register contains more than just
regulatory obligations. Of course, as others have pointed out in the past, the
Federal Register contains a variety of nonbinding notices and other materials
too.175 Even final rule documents themselves contain lengthy preambles that are
not technically binding law.176 But to date, no one has uncovered the hidden
170. 83 Fed. Reg. 28,528, 28,528-29 (June 20, 2018) (to be codified in scattered parts of 14 C.F.R.).
171. Id. at 94,028-29.
172. Lexis does not permit searching by title, so we used the Mercatus Center’s QuantGov

data. See QUANTGOV, https://perma.cc/37D2-UTQW (archived Jan. 9, 2021).
173. Exempt constituted 0.86% of all words in final-rule titles during that time period, while

require constituted 0.81%.
174. Overall, the titles for final-rule documents in the Federal Register from 1996 to 2017
contained 13,312 obligation-alleviating words and 12,703 obligation-imposing words.
175. See CAREY, supra note 165, at 14-16 (explaining why page counts in the Federal Register
are likely to give “only a rough approximation of regulatory activity each year”).
176. For instance, the Clinton-era ergonomics rule was 608 pages long when printed in the
Federal Register, but only eight of these pages contained actual rule text. See CINDY
SKRZYCKI, THE REGULATORS: ANONYMOUS POWER BROKERS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 2728 (2003) (discussing Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262, 68,846-54 (Nov. 14,
2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)).

926

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

world of unrules within the pages of the Federal Register. We have found
significant indicia of unrules, quantifying how ubiquitous they are. Even
documents expressly labeled by agencies as “final rules” are sometimes really just
unrules.
C. Unrules in the Code of Federal Regulations
If we turn to the source of regulatory law that comprises solely binding
text—the CFR—we still find evidence of the ubiquity of unrules. The U.S.
Government Publishing Office (GPO) makes the entire CFR available in
machine-readable format, allowing us to perform the same term frequency
analysis on the CFR from 2005 to 2017 as we did on the Federal Register text.177
In 2017, the latest year available when we conducted our analysis, the CFR
contained 241,225 individual occurrences of obligation-alleviating terms. As
one might expect, the CFR contained many more individual occurrences of
obligation-imposing terms: 1,429,897.178 But the ratio of obligation-alleviating
words to obligation-imposing words in the CFR was 1.0 for every 5.9—only a
slightly higher rate of obligation-imposing language than what we found in
the Federal Register. By far the most prominent word indicative of obligation
alleviation was except, with 119,618 occurrences in the 2017 edition of the CFR.
To put that number in perspective, except appeared about 3.5 times more
frequently than two of the five obligation-imposing terms: prohibit (34,417) and
may not (31,544) in that same year. To be sure, the other obligation-alleviating
terms were less common. In 2017, the term exempt appeared 56,119 times; the
term exclude appeared 33,015 times; the term waive appeared 29,617 times; and
the term variance occurred only 2,856 times. Yet as a group, obligation-alleviating
terms are far from negligible.
Because the CFR text is available on an annual basis from 2005 to 2017,
we were also able to trace the overall trend in the growth of unrules in the
CFR. As Figure 2.A shows, the use of obligation-alleviating terms appears to
be on an upwards trajectory, with the total volume of alleviating terms
growing by approximately 20% since 2005.179 And Figure 2.B, which shows how
177. U.S. GPO, Bulk Data Repository, GOVINFO, https://perma.cc/6UAX-A9QN (archived

Dec. 30, 2020) (to locate, click “View the live page”). These data are in principle available
from 1996 to the present, although we discovered irregularities in how data were entered
in the earlier years that led us to limit our analysis to the years that we report above.
178. Note that our counts of obligation-imposing terms are slightly higher than those
reported through 2012 from RegData. Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 115
fig.2. This is because we included inflected and derived forms of RegData’s base obligationimposing dictionary in order to match our approach to obligation-alleviating terms.
179. It is notable that this increase is quite similar to the rate of increase in our data during
the same time period for obligation-imposing terms (23%). Although we do not know
what Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin would find in their data with respect to obligationfootnote continued on next page
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Figure 2.A
Obligation-Alleviating Terms in the CFR (2005-2017)

the ratio of alleviating to imposing terms has changed over the period of
observation, suggests that there is a stable balance between rules and
unrules—neither has grown at a significantly higher rate than the other over
this time period.180

alleviating terms (because their research focused only on obligation-imposing words),
it is also notable that our finding for the increase in obligation-imposing terms is
similar to Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin’s finding that such terms increased by 20.4%
from 1997 to 2012. See id. at 112.
180. The ratio of alleviating to imposing terms remains between 1:5.8 and 1:6 for the thirteenyear period.

928

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

Figure 2.B
Ratio of Obligation-Alleviating Terms to
Obligation-Imposing Terms in the CFR (2005-2017)

Each title of the CFR contains regulatory text organized by topical areas. For
example, Title 40 contains regulations governing environmental protection, and
Title 47 contains regulations governing telecommunications. Figure 3 shows how
the overall ratio of obligation-alleviating terms to obligation-imposing terms
varies across CFR titles. In Figure 3, a longer bar means that the title contains
more alleviating words relative to obligation-imposing words; the shorter bars
reveal areas of federal regulation that are relatively obligation imposing. The
title for Labor falls roughly at average for the overall CFR, so titles higher than
Labor in Figure 3 are above average in their ratio of alleviating to imposing
terms. There are some surprises here. Tax regulations, for example, are the part
of the CFR most rich in unrule language, with about one obligation-alleviating

929

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

Figure 3
Ratio of Obligation-Alleviating to Obligation-Imposing Terms by CFR Title

word for every three obligation-imposing words—a finding at odds with
common perceptions of tax regulations as exceedingly burdensome (although
perhaps more consistent with perceptions that they are complex). By contrast,
some topical areas that might be associated with a heavy presence of lobbyists
seeking exemptions and waivers—namely, agriculture and mineral resources—
fall more on the obligation-imposition end of the spectrum.181
181. This may not be as surprising if one considers the public-choice argument that

incumbent firms often seek regulation as a means of discouraging new entrants and
eliminating competition in their industry. For a recent statement of this argument, see
BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL
ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 34 (2017)
footnote continued on next page
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D. Unrules in Economically Significant Regulations
Next, to see whether unrules make regular appearances in the most
economically significant regulations, we made use of designations drawn from
Executive Order 12,866.182 Out of the several thousand final rules published
each year in the Federal Register, only a few hundred are typically categorized as
“significant rules” under the executive order. Only an even more select subset—
usually a few dozen per year—are further categorized as “economically
significant,” a designation limited to regulations that are “likely to have an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”183 Economically
significant regulations receive close scrutiny from the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), as agencies are required to prepare
comprehensive estimates of the costs and benefits of both the proposed and
final versions of these rules.184 Critics of regulation often focus on this subset
of regulations because of its outsized economic impact.185
We analyzed the binding language contained in all economically significant
federal regulations issued between 1982 and 2016, which amounted to a total of
1,210 rules.186 Drawing on our dictionary of obligation-imposing and obligationalleviating words, we again found evidence of unrules’ ubiquity. Across all
agencies’ economically significant rules, one alleviating word appeared for about
every 6.0 obligation-imposing words, with a mean of 32 alleviating terms per
rule (median of 10) and a mean of 186 obligation-imposing terms per rule
(median of 61). There were, of course, substantial outliers: One rule, for example,
contained 761 individual occurrences of alleviating terms.187 Overall, it was not

182.
183.
184.
185.

186.

187.

(arguing that, in a variety of contexts, “regulation . . . shields businesses as diverse as
auto dealers, funeral directors, and hospitals from competition”).
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note.
Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., Exec. Off. of the President, Regulations and the Rulemaking
Process, REGINFO.GOV, https://perma.cc/ZYY6-GHW7 (archived Dec. 30, 2020).
CAREY, supra note 165, at 1, 4.
See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Here Are All 205 “Economically Significant” Rules in the Spring
2015 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.: BLOG (June 2, 2015),
https://perma.cc/LMR9-84UZ.
Prior to the adoption of Executive Order 12,866, rules surpassing the same $100 million
threshold were classified as “major” under Executive Order 12,291, see 3 C.F.R. 127
(1982), and those rules are also included here.
See Control of Emissions from Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines and Equipment, 73 Fed.
Reg. 59,034 (Oct. 8, 2008) (to be codified in scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). This economically
significant rule contained passages chock-full of unrule language, such as the following:
We are extending our basic nonroad exemptions to the . . . engines and vessels covered by this
rule. These include the testing exemption, the manufacturer-owned exemption, the display
exemption, and the national-security exemption. If the conditions for an exemption are met,
then the engine is not subject to the exhaust emission standards.

Id. at 59,050.
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surprising that almost every economically significant rule contained at least one
obligation-imposing word (97%), but the vast majority (84%) also included at least
one obligation-alleviating word.
E. Unrules in the United States Code
Although our main focus here has been on documenting administrative
agencies’ use of unrules, the words that agencies use in their regulations must
ultimately find authority in statutes passed by Congress. Federal statutes often
create carveouts that agencies simply parrot in regulatory text. Furthermore,
statutes also authorize agencies to issue dispensations, either from statutory
obligations or from obligations contained in agency regulations. We thus
looked to statutory law to gauge how frequently Congress introduces
obligation alleviation into the legislative corpus, and we found that the United
States Code exhibits a comparable level of obligation-alleviating language.
Across the entire legislative corpus, we found 80,566 alleviating terms, which
translates to about one alleviating term for every 6.5 obligation-imposing
terms.188 The sections of the Code governing taxation, bankruptcy, and
copyrights exhibited some of the most frequent instances of alleviating terms
as well as the lowest ratios of obligation-imposing words to obligationalleviating words—that is, they appear to be the most unrule-laden.
We should note, of course, that obligation-imposing and obligationalleviating language in statutes is not always aimed at private actors. An
obligation-imposing term such as shall might well bind a business, but it could
just as easily obligate an agency or a state to issue a regulation189—or even
require an agency to issue a waiver.190 Likewise, an obligation-alleviating term
might be used to permit an agency flexibility to alter its program, perhaps even
188. The Code contained a total of 524,647 obligation-imposing terms as of June 2019.
189. See generally Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, From Legislation to Regulation:

An Empirical Examination of Agency Responsiveness to Congressional Delegations of
Regulatory Authority, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 395 (2016) (discussing Congress’s ability to
impose mandates for rulemaking). For instance, portions of the Toxic Substances
Control Act provide that the EPA Administrator “shall promulgate regulations which
prescribe procedures . . . for determining whether asbestos-containing material is
present in a school building under the authority of a local educational agency,” and
require the Administrator to do so within 360 days of the passage of the statute. 15
U.S.C. § 2643(a)-(b).
190. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(5)(C) (“[T]he Secretary [of Agriculture] shall waive subparagraph
(A) if the eligible livestock producer pays a fee in an amount equal to the applicable
noninsured crop assistance program fee or catastrophic risk protection plan fee
required under subparagraph (A) . . . .”); 33 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (“The Secretary [of the
Interior] shall waive local cost-sharing requirements up to $200,000 for all studies and
projects—(1) in American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and (2) for any
Indian tribe or tribal organization . . . .”).
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by imposing new obligations on private actors.191 Probably more so than with
the agency-level sources of regulatory law, data on federal statutes are bound
to have some noise to them. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the ratio of
obligation-alleviating to obligation-imposing terms in the United States Code is
similar to the ratios in agency sources of regulatory law.
F. Summary and Implications
Across the board, we identify strikingly consistent patterns that reveal an
extensive role for obligation alleviation in the regulatory state.192 Drawing
upon a variety of sources of regulatory law, we find one obligation-alleviating
word for approximately every six obligation-imposing words in federal law.
The titles of Federal Register documents—representing the agencies’ own
descriptions of what they are doing—even contain more obligation-alleviating
words than obligation-imposing words.193
These findings are all the more powerful because our analysis understates
the prevalence and significance of unrules in the regulatory state. First, some
dispensation-authorizing provisions sweep extremely broadly: For example,
“[t]he Administrator may waive the provisions of this subpart for a manufacturer
or a specific engine family.”194 As a result, a single obligation-alleviating word can
authorize an agency to alleviate the obligations imposed by dozens, if not
hundreds or thousands, of obligation-imposing words. Restrictions rarely
have such a multiplicative, omnibus quality, because the imposition of an
obligation must be reasonably defined to have any meaningful communicative
and behavioral effect. Second, some obligation alleviation occurs without the use
of any of the five words in our dictionary. In fact, as we discussed in Part I, some
unrules are never explicitly spelled out, or they derive from agencies’ discretion
over enforcement.195 Finally, our analysis of regulatory texts does not capture all
of the dispensations that agencies issue. We did find and measure some instances
191. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60118(c)(1)(A) (“On application of an owner or operator of a pipeline

192.

193.
194.
195.

facility, the Secretary [of Transportation] by order may waive compliance with any
part of an applicable standard prescribed under this chapter with respect to such
facility on terms the Secretary considers appropriate if the Secretary determines that
the waiver is not inconsistent with pipeline safety.” (emphasis added)).
See infra Table 2. The ratios listed in Table 2 for the Federal Register, the CFR, and the
United States Code are for the latest years available for each, as indicated in the text. The
ratio shown in Table 2 for economically significant rules is for all such rules issued
between 1982 and 2016.
See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
40 C.F.R. § 91.501(b) (2020) (emphasis added).
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (discussing agencies’ broad discretion
to decide not to enforce the law, analogizing to the “decision of a prosecutor in the
Executive Branch not to indict”).
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Table 2
Ratios Between Obligation-Alleviating and
Obligation-Imposing Terms
Source

Ratio

Federal Register

1:5.1

CFR

1:5.9

Economically significant regulations

1:6.0

United States Code

1:6.5

of dispensations in our analysis of Federal Register documents.196 But few agencies
are obligated to publish their dispensations in the Federal Register.197 And the
CFR and the United States Code do not contain any dispensations at all—they
contain carveouts and language authorizing agencies to issue dispensations. A full
accounting of actual dispensations granted by agencies would be an enormous,
even impossible, project due to the lack of public transparency of obligation
alleviation.198
Our analysis of unrules demonstrates a need to reorient thinking about
administrative power and discretion. For one thing, it is clearly misleading for
critics of regulation to continue to suggest that the growth in the number of
pages in the Federal Register or the CFR reveals an administrative state bent on
imposing obligations. Our empirical findings raise questions about how truly
restrictive and burdensome federal regulation is in practice. They also raise
serious concerns about the potential dangers associated with a ubiquitous source
of agency discretion. The risks of unrules outlined in Part I are real—and they
become all the more disquieting once it is clear how pervasive unrules truly are.
The purpose of this Part has been to demonstrate that unrules are an
omnipresent and essential feature of regulatory law. We recognize, of course,
that the foregoing analysis, in simply aiming to assess the extent of unrules in
the regulatory canon, has only scratched the surface of the research questions
that could be asked about unrules. Future empirical research with these data
could include studies relating changes in the frequency of unrules to patterns
in the amount of delegation from Congress to agencies; studies analyzing
unrule trends by presidential administration, political party control of
government, or time; and studies testing whether unrules enable greater
aggregate levels of regulation by creating escape hatches and flexibility. The

196. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
197. See infra Table 3.
198. See infra Part III.B.2.
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significance of such future inquiries should be more than evident, given our
findings that show how ubiquitous unrules are within the administrative state.
III. Reorienting Administrative Law
We now turn to what unrules’ ubiquity means for administrative law.199
Administrative law aims to ensure that agency discretion is channeled in ways
that can ensure fair decisionmaking and desirable outcomes. With such an
important mission, it would seem that administrative law should be just as
concerned about agency discretion in alleviating obligations as in imposing
them, given that discretion in both directions can be abused or otherwise lead
to problems.200 Yet when it comes to unrules, administrative law practice and
scholarship have remained out of balance.201
Consider one of the Supreme Court’s most widely discussed administrative
law cases of all time: the Benzene Case. In resolving a dispute over a federal
health standard, the Court sharply constrained the power of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to obligate employers to protect
their workers from exposure to harmful toxic chemicals in the workplace.202
In lowering its standard for air concentrations of benzene, OSHA had argued
that because benzene was a carcinogen, the agency could assume that any level
of exposure to the chemical put workers at risk. Worried that OSHA’s
approach to carcinogens would give the agency “sweeping” regulatory power,
the Court interpreted the underlying statute to demand that, before adopting

199. As we discussed in Part II, statutes contain unrules, but our discussion here, in Part III,

focuses on agencies’ power to alleviate obligations. Unlike agencies, which are subject to
administrative law, the only practical constraints on Congress’s exercise of its
constitutionally delegated discretion are political, with courts traditionally imposing
only a weak form of rational basis review on congressional action. JERRY L. MASHAW,
REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 3 (2018) (“American law has in crucial ways given
up on the project of rationality as applied to legislative action.”). Granted, questions have
arisen under the guise of the nondelegation doctrine about constitutional limits on
congressional delegations, even in the context of giving so-called “big waiver” authority
to agencies. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 76, at 267-69; Deacon, supra note 76, at 155152, 1605. But the nondelegation doctrine leaves little room for constraining Congress’s
delegation in general, whether with respect to imposing or alleviating obligations. See
generally Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (2019) (showing
how the nondelegation doctrine constrains Congress only in a limited space).
200. See supra Part I.B.
201. See infra Part III.A.
202. See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 644-45 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
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or revising workplace health standards, OSHA demonstrate with “substantial
evidence” a “significant risk” of harm.203
This core ruling in the Benzene Case, constraining the agency’s ability to
set regulatory standards, epitomizes administrative law’s central concern
with obligation imposition. At the same time that the Court fixated on
OSHA’s power to impose health-related standards, though, it did absolutely
nothing about a stunning carveout in OSHA’s benzene decision. The agency
had tightened its applicable health standard only for workers at refineries
and other petrochemical facilities, excluding entirely from the coverage of its
more protective standard the most numerous category of employees exposed
to benzene: gas station attendants. To its credit, the Court at least
acknowledged that this exclusion of service station workers was
“particularly significant”204—but the exclusion was not at all legally
significant to the Court. The Justices said nothing disapproving of OSHA’s
decision to leave 800,000 workers outside the rule’s coverage and exposed to
heightened levels of benzene.205 Instead, they quickly turned to enumerating
the hundreds of millions of dollars in economic costs that OSHA’s new
benzene standard would impose on those industries to which it did apply.206
In its holding, the Court sharply rebuked OSHA for asserting power to
impose standards at nearly any level of workplace risk, agreeing with the
court of appeals that OSHA’s underlying statute did not give the agency
“unbridled discretion” in setting workplace health standards.207
Contrast the Court’s rebuke of broad discretion over obligation imposition
in Benzene with the Court’s ready embrace of an agency’s “virtually unbridled
discretion” over obligation alleviation in a subsequent case, Little Sisters of the
203. Id. at 646, 653.
204. Id. at 628.
205. Id. We do not contend that the Court necessarily should have disapproved OSHA’s

carveout, at least not under prevailing legal principles. After all, the litigants themselves
had not objected to OSHA’s carveout. But it is not unheard of for the Supreme Court to
use opinions to focus public attention on problematic features in the law that are not,
strictly speaking, at issue in the case before the Court. It is also not clear who would have
objected, especially as service-station workers were presumably not highly unionized and
thus not well organized to mount a legal challenge that could have sought to protect their
interests. That very fact, though, helps to illustrate the overall bias in the regulatory state
that we discuss in this Part. Those entities upon whom an agency imposes obligations
will always be able to seek judicial review, while it is far less clear who can or will seek
such review when agencies alleviate obligations. Some of this bias in judicial oversight
stems from the law, such as standing doctrine, and some from a political economy that,
when combined with law, leaves agencies less constrained when alleviating obligation
than when imposing them. See infra Parts III.B-.C.
206. Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 628-29 (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 614-15 (quoting Am. Petrol. Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978), aff ’d
sub nom. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petrol. Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607 (1980)).
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Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.208 As in the Benzene Case, the
Court in Little Sisters of the Poor confronted a statute that authorized an agency
to set standards; in the latter case, the standards centered on the type of
“preventive care and screenings” for women’s health that insurance plans
under the ACA needed to provide.209 The ACA did not expressly authorize the
agency to make any exceptions in who must provide insurance coverage with
such preventive care—and arguably the statute even precluded any such
exceptions due to its unqualified command that insurance plans under the ACA
“shall” provide such care specified by the agency.210 But the Court readily
concluded that “the same capacious grant of authority that empowers [the
agency] to make . . . determinations [of covered care] leaves its discretion
equally unchecked in other areas, including the ability to identify and create
exemptions.”211
In this Part, we draw out further the contrast exemplified by Little Sisters
of the Poor and the Benzene Case. We show how administrative law—whether
viewed from the standpoint of its motivating purposes, its procedures, or its
prospects for meaningful judicial review—imposes less oversight and fewer
constraints on agencies when they alleviate obligations than when they
impose obligations. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that unrules escape
scrutiny entirely. Different procedural requirements will apply to carveouts
than to dispensations, in many instances constraining the former more than
the latter. Moreover, courts can and do at times review certain unrules.212
Nevertheless, it remains clear that administrative law is more readily responsive
to the concerns of potential obligatees and more focused on protecting private
208. 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2380 (2020).
209. Id. at 2373 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).
210. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 570-71 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d sub nom.

Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. 2367.
211. Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2380.
212. A number of Supreme Court decisions have involved the review of carveouts, and,

unlike with Little Sisters of the Poor, they sometimes have resulted in vacatur of the
carveout. See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014) (holding that a
carveout for small sources of greenhouse-gas emissions was invalid because it could not
be reconciled with the text of the Clean Air Act). Although judicial challenges to
dispensations arise less frequently, they still sometimes occur, as with the EPA
renewable fuel waivers discussed in Part I. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Ass’n, No. 20-472 (U.S.
Sept. 4, 2020), 2020 WL 6064084 (presenting a question about whether EPA erred in
granting a hardship exemption when the recipient had not continuously received an
extension of such an exemption for each year since 2011). Furthermore, although
administrative law scholars had not previously created a unified framework for the
study of unrules, as we have here, they had, as we noted earlier, produced important
work separately on either dispensations or carveouts. See supra notes 32, 35 and
accompanying text.
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rights against the government’s power to impose obligations.213 In pointing
to this imbalance, we suggest ways that administrative law can and should be
reoriented in a direction that would more fully account for the risks of unrules.
A. Administrative Law’s Preoccupation with Obligation Imposition
Nearly a hundred years ago, Felix Frankfurter emphasized that
administrative law’s central concern lay with the power of “legal control”
exercised by administrative agencies.214 Throughout the last century,
administrative law’s raison d’être has been protecting individual and economic
liberty from state intrusion.215 Such an understanding of administrative law
permeates much of the APA, which, since its enactment in 1946, has operated as a
kind of mini-constitution for the modern administrative state.216 The APA sets

213. As a very rough indicator of administrative law’s emphasis on obligation imposition, we

conducted searches in Lexis for law review article titles in the administrative law topical
areas for the period from January 1, 1980, to January 1, 2020. We conducted these
searches in two different topical databases for administrative law, one for articles
published in all journals that Lexis designates as in the administrative law practice area,
and another for articles that Lexis designates as being in the area of administrative law
but that appear in any journal. For both databases, one of our searches centered on agency
actions typically associated with obligation imposition: title(rule or rulemaking or order).
The other search used the five words in our obligation-alleviating dictionary: title(waiv! or
exempt! or variance or except! or exclu!). Even though the latter search included more words,
as well as their cognates and inflections, we found in the two databases 3.8 and 5.4 times as
many article titles containing the search words “rules,” “rulemaking,” or “order.” We
recognize, of course, that these words are not a perfect proxy for obligation imposition,
even though they are widely used in such a manner.
214. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 614-15 (1927).
215. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 378 (1982) (describing
administrative law’s “original objective” as one of “control[ling] government incursions
upon private liberty and property interests”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein,
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1982) (“Under the
traditional model of administrative law, . . . the system limits the power of
government, maintains a well-ordered sphere of private liberty, and preserves the
system of market exchange.”); Richard B. Stewart, Essay, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438-39 (2003) (“The traditional core of
administrative law has focused on securing the rule of law and protecting liberty . . . .
Here the function of administrative law is primarily negative: to prevent unlawful or
arbitrary administrative exercise of coercive power against private persons.”).
216. See Christopher J. Walker, Essay, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 630 (2017) (“Over the decades, the APA has assumed quasiconstitutional status.”); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative
Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1208 (2015) (arguing that the APA is the “ ‘fundamental
charter’ of the ‘Fourth Branch’ of government” (first quoting Jack M. Beermann & Gary
Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 874 (2007))).
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out the basic framework governing rulemaking and adjudication,217 but
strikingly it makes at most passing reference in a few provisions to agencies’
authority to grant dispensations.218 The bulk of the statute addresses procedures
for, and judicial oversight of, agencies’ exercise of their discretion to impose
obligations.
The APA came into existence largely in response to concerns of conservative
Republicans and Southern Democrats who worried about the intervention of
New Deal agencies in private markets.219 For over a decade before 1946, these
politicians allied with the American Bar Association and the American Liberty
League to push back against the growing power of the administrative state.220
These conservative forces “sought ‘individual rights,’ which were individuals’ and
businesses’ rights to prevent an agency from implementing New Deal programs
unless the agency both jumped through numerous procedural hoops and received
the blessing of a conservative federal judge.”221
To be sure, contemporary scholarly accounts of the APA’s postenactment
history claim that liberal New Dealers largely succeeded in convincing courts
that provisions in the APA merely restated existing principles of administrative
law and did not fundamentally alter the balance between governmental power
and individual rights.222 But even if, in the end, the New Dealers beat back the
conservative efforts to stop the New Deal, the contestation over the APA before
and after its passage was largely about constraining governmental power to
impose obligations, not its power to alleviate obligations.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (establishing procedures governing informal rulemaking); id. § 554

218.

219.

220.
221.
222.

(establishing procedures governing adjudication); id. § 706 (setting out standards
governing judicial review of agency action).
Mostly these provisions are found in the definitions section of the APA. See, e.g., id.
§ 551(6) (providing that “orders” may be “affirmative” or “negative”); id. § 551(8)
(defining “license” to include “statutory exemption or other form of permission”); id.
§ 551(11) (defining “relief ” to include “exemption[s]” and “exception[s]”); id. § 551(13)
(defining “agency action” to include the “failure to act”). In one procedural provision,
the APA expressly gives unrules a pass, providing that agencies do not need to wait the
normal thirty days after finalizing a rule for it to take effect if it is “a substantive rule
which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction.” Id. § 553(d)(1).
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New
Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996); see also JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE
UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59-108
(2012) (providing a detailed historical account of the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act). To some degree, the political fight predated the New Deal era, see
Metzger, supra note 24, at 51 (“Building out the national state was a constant and
contested process from the Founding through the nineteenth century.”), but never before
the APA had the construction of administrative law been so explicitly undertaken.
See Shepherd, supra note 219, at 1570-75; Metzger, supra note 24, at 52-53.
Shepherd, supra note 219, at 1680.
See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 216, at 1208; Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72
VA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1986).
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New Deal administrative lawyers, such as James Landis, were not much
interested in legal constraint of any kind on the growing administrative state,
believing instead that agencies should be imbued with far-ranging discretion
and constrained only by professional norms of expertise.223 These lawyers
prized agency “efficiency” and saw the APA’s modest constraints on obligation
imposition as largely a token concession to conservatives and business
interests who were primarily concerned with the effects of regulation on
economic liberty.224 The APA’s relative silence about legal constraints on
obligation alleviation most likely was understood as a virtue, not a vice, if it
was even noticed at all.
The APA’s motivating purpose of constraining obligation imposition
continues to underpin contemporary thinking about administrative law. Since
at least the early 1990s, one school of thought has lamented what is perceived as
the undue constraints that administrative law has placed on obligation
imposition—constraints that supposedly have “ossified” agencies’ ability to
adopt new mandates.225 In this widely accepted account, concern about the
ossification of rulemaking has resulted from both judicial review under the
APA226 and the layering of additional legal procedures on agencies’ obligationimposition discretion, including White House oversight of rulemaking.227
Another contemporary school of thought embraces more of an outright
disdain for obligation imposition. Drawing attention to a series of decisions by
the D.C. Circuit, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have described as
administrative law libertarianism a judicial and scholarly movement that seeks
to protect individual rights and an open market against government
intervention.228 Although Sunstein and Vermeule argue against administrative
223. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 419,
224.

225.

226.

227.
228.

426 (1996).
See Shepherd, supra note 219, at 1680-81 (noting that the “APA was the armistice of a
fierce political battle over administrative reform” between New Dealers, who sought
to allow agencies “to implement New Deal programs quickly,” and individuals and
businesses who sought to limit those programs).
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (lamenting the accretion of constraints on rulemaking that
have made it harder for agencies to impose new obligations).
See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225
(1990) (asserting that the threat of judicial review led the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration to all but abandon automotive-safety rulemaking); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of
Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 313
(suggesting that, due to the burdens and uncertainties created by judicial review,
“rulemaking as a vehicle for making policy decisions may soon be relegated to a
chapter in a legal history book”).
See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 225, at 1431-34.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 398-99.
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law exhibiting a strong tilt toward any political theory, let alone making
libertarianism its “master principle,”229 they still do acknowledge that
administrative law “does have libertarian features”230 and argue that “the
movement toward libertarian principles and outcomes is unmistakable.”231
Today’s debates over administrative law—its libertarian as well as its
progressive elements—tend to reflect much of the debate surrounding the APA’s
adoption in the 1940s.232 Even concern over “ossification” had its antecedents in
that earlier period.233 Yet what should be evident is how little of the debate then,
or now, has revolved around agency power to lift or alleviate obligations.
Overall, unrules have remained largely in the background—hiding in what we
refer to as administrative law’s “blind spot.” Administrative law’s relative
preoccupation with obligation imposition has obscured in consequential ways
the extent and importance of agencies’ power to alleviate obligations.234
B. Procedural Manifestations of Administrative Law’s Blind Spot
Administrative law’s blind spot has manifested itself in a variety of
procedures that tend to give agencies greater discretion when alleviating
obligations than when imposing them. When it comes to imposing obligations,
agencies must follow a variety of steps that aim to promote sound decisionmaking, ensure transparency and opportunities for public participation, and
minimize the risk of regulatory capture.235 Although some of these requirements
229. Id. at 467.
230. Id. at 464.
231. Id. at 472-73.
232. E.g., Metzger, supra note 24, at 61-62 (linking the passage of the APA to the efforts of

the conservative ABA Special Committee in the 1930s).
233. See Cary Coglianese, Essay, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON

REGUL. 85, 90 (2008).
234. See supra Part I.
235. Much administrative law scholarship focuses on these procedures. See, e.g., MASHAW,

supra note 199, at 44 (“American administrative agencies are awash in statutory
requirements for reason-giving, analysis, and explanation.”); STEVEN P. CROLEY,
REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY
GOVERNMENT 73-74 (2008) (explaining how administrative procedures aim to reduce
the risk of capture); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Opinion, Public
Engagement in Rulemaking, REGUL. REV. (June 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/X9ZL-REAC
(discussing various procedures for enhancing public participation in rulemaking). Of
course, we recognize that just because procedures aim to promote participation in
rulemaking, this does not mean that vast swaths of the public do in practice get
involved in most rulemakings. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 125 (2011) (finding that the prenotice of proposed rulemaking period
was “almost completely monopolized by regulated parties”); Cary Coglianese, Citizen
Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 964-67 (2006)
footnote continued on next page
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are stated neutrally enough that at first glance they might appear to apply to
carveouts and even some kinds of dispensations, in point of fact they do not
always apply, or apply with equal vigor, to unrules as they do to rules.
1.

Making rules versus unrules

Under the APA, the basic procedure for creating new obligations calls for
agencies to publish a notice of a proposed regulation—one that states the actual
obligations the agency plans to put into law—and then to provide an
opportunity for members of the public to submit comments on the proposal.236
An agency’s final regulation must be published in the Federal Register. It must also
constitute a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed regulation, meaning that
agencies cannot tack on new obligations that were not part of, or closely
connected to, the proposed ones.237 Any such new obligations would necessitate
an additional round of notice and comment.238
A variety of additional statutes and executive orders layer other
requirements on top of these APA procedures.239 For example, under Executive
Order 12,866, any proposed regulation deemed economically significant—based
on the expected economic impact of its new obligations—must be accompanied

236.

237.

238.

239.

(discussing the failure of public participation methods to induce widespread
participation of non-elites).
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). Additional requirements apply if agencies are to impose obligations
through so-called formal rulemaking or adjudication. See id. §§ 556-557. When agencies
show good cause, they can bypass this comment process and publish a final rule
without any advance notice. See id. § 553(b)(3)(B). Note that this is a carveout for the
procedural rules for making rules. Empirical research suggests the significance of this
unrule, as a large proportion of all agency rules make use of the good cause exemption.
See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 6869 (2015) (finding that agencies “exempted approximately 50% of rules from the APA
notice-and-comment process” between 1995 and 2012).
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Covad Commc’ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d 528, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The court also noted
that the logical-outgrowth test protects the public from having to “divine the agency’s
unspoken thoughts” in commenting on a proposed rule. Id. at 1080 (alteration omitted)
(quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
1250, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
See Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“We apply that
standard functionally by asking whether ‘the purposes of notice and comment have
been adequately served,’ that is, whether a new round of notice and comment would
provide the first opportunity for interested parties to offer comments that could
persuade the agency to modify its rule.” (citation omitted) (quoting Fertilizer Inst. v.
U.S. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991))).
A few examples include the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164
(1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612); the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); and
Executive Order 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note.
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by a regulatory impact analysis.240 That agency-developed analysis must then be
reviewed by OIRA before the agency publishes its proposed regulation and then
again before the agency makes the regulation final.241
By contrast, when it comes to obligation alleviation, the required procedures
that agencies must follow are not as demanding. Of course, the precise
procedural steps vary depending on the type of unrule. For dispensations, the
procedures are virtually nonexistent. Let us start, though, with carveouts.
The procedures for carveouts would seem to follow those for regulations,
simply because these unrules are, by definition, effectively embedded in a rule.242
To be sure, carveouts that are expressly stated in a proposed regulation will be
subject to normal notice and public-comment requirements. But there is in fact
no requirement that carveouts always be stated, let alone stated clearly enough to
provide notice of the existence of the carveout. OSHA might, for instance,
propose a regulation that tightens standards for one class of workplaces without
ever saying that similar hazards at other workplaces are not encompassed by the
proposed rule. Sometimes, a carveout is visible only through a kind of expressio
unius implication—the coverage of one expressly covered category of actors or
activities implies the exclusion of all others.243 Presumably experts or industry
insiders would understand the significance of what the agency left out, and the
agency would certainly need to respond if comments drew attention to an
unstated carveout. But unlike when they are imposing new obligations, agencies
have no inherent procedural duty when creating carveouts to state the facilities
or industries that have been left out of a regulation’s coverage. For the lay public,
the carveout will be essentially undiscoverable unless third-party intermediaries
interpret for them what the agency has not said.
Carveouts added at the end of the rulemaking process would also be less
likely to trigger the need for supplemental notice to satisfy the logicaloutgrowth test. An agency satisfies the logical-outgrowth test if “interested
parties ‘should have anticipated that the change was possible, and thus
reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-

240. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 645-46 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601

note.
241. Id. at 646-48.
242. See supra Part I.A.1.
243. See NLRB v. Sw. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017) (discussing the expressio unius canon

of construction—namely, “expressing one item of [an] associated group or series
excludes another left unmentioned”—and noting that the “force of any negative
implication . . . depends on context” (first alteration in original) (first quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002); and then quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue
Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013))).
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and-comment period.’”244 Almost by necessity, a subtraction in a regulatory
obligation contained in a proposed rule will be reasonably foreseeable, so the
logical-outgrowth test presumably never (or at most rarely) bars the alleviation
of proposed obligations.245 In fact, Supreme Court precedents approve the
wholesale withdrawal of proposed regulations,246 even though the opposite of
that—the proposal of an entirely new obligation—would be the paradigmatic
case that flunks the logical-outgrowth test. Given this asymmetry, empirical
researchers have unsurprisingly found that changes during the notice-andcomment process “are often subtractive rather than innovative or additive.”247
When it comes to the White House regulatory review process, the
procedural asymmetry persists. If an agency proposes an amendment to a
regulation that would impose obligations creating an additional $100 million in
annual costs, it will trigger Executive Order 12,866’s analysis requirement.248 But
244. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259

245.

246.

247.

248.

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Ne. Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 952 (D.C.
Cir. 2004)).
See Idaho Conservation League v. Wheeler, 930 F.3d 494, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Under
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the EPA’s Final Action not to adopt financial
responsibility requirements for the hardrock mining industry constitutes a logical
outgrowth of the Proposed Rule because ‘[o]ne logical outgrowth of a proposal is
surely . . . to refrain from taking the proposed step.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting
New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam))).
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 175 (2007) (“Since the proposed
rule was simply a proposal, its presence meant that the Department was considering the
matter; after that consideration the Department might choose to adopt the proposal or
to withdraw it. As it turned out, the Department did withdraw the proposal . . . . We do
not understand why such a possibility was not reasonably foreseeable.”). Long Island
Care at Home presents an interesting twist on an unrule: The Department of Labor
proposed changing its longstanding unrule excluding certain companionship workers
from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “domestic service” employee exemption, and
therefore including these workers in wage-and-hour regulations that otherwise apply
to workers. Id. at 174. But after the comment period, the Department withdrew the
rule, restoring the unrule. Id. at 175. The Court refused to see any role for the logicaloutgrowth doctrine, noting that the “proposed rule was simply a proposal” and that
complete abandonment of the effort to close the carveout was foreseeable given any
lack of commitment on the part of the Department. Id. Much the same logic applies to
other efforts at obligation alleviation.
William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness
in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 67
(2004); see also William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules
and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 581 (2009) (“One possible
implication of the need to provide adequate notice is a bias in favor of subtractive
changes in proposed rules.”); Wagner et al., supra note 235, at 132 (finding that
“comments to strengthen the rule were not only fewer in number, but were less
successful as compared with their counterparts striving to weaken the rule”).
The executive order calls for analyses of rules expected to have an annual economic
impact of $100 million or more, by which OIRA means costs. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638, 641, 645-46 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note. Similar statutory
footnote continued on next page
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a proposed amendment that would add a carveout and reduce regulated entities’
costs by $100 million would simply not appear on OIRA’s radar.249 It is widely
understood that OIRA scrutinizes obligation imposition much more than it
worries about the alleviation of needed obligations.250 OIRA is even said to let
agency decisions that lighten regulatory burdens “get a pass.”251
OIRA’s tendency toward lighter scrutiny of carveouts was only
exacerbated by then-President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771 (the so-called
1-in-2-out order).252 This order imposed a regulatory-budgeting regime based

249.

250.

251.

252.

requirements are also triggered by obligation imposition. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (requiring advance notice of the “significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities”); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1532(a)
(“[T]he expenditure . . . by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually
for inflation) in any 1 year . . . .”).
The way Executive Order 12,866 is written, to call for analysis when new regulations
would “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely
affect in a material way the economy,” should demand review even if cost savings (that
is, benefits) are of sufficient magnitude to push a proposed regulation over the
threshold. 3 C.F.R. at 641, 645-46. But we have been told by former OIRA personnel
that the only impacts that matter for this threshold are costs.
See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1377-91 (2013) (arguing that OIRA should look to
rulemaking petitions to identify areas where agencies should regulate but are not and
to subject these areas to regulatory review of inaction). For a short time under the
leadership of Administrator John Graham, OIRA would issue occasional “prompt
letters” to encourage agencies to look into the possibility of imposing obligations to
address new risks or neglected problems, but the number of such prompt letters was
but a small fraction of OIRA’s reviews of new rules, and agencies had no obligation to
accept OIRA’s suggestion that it impose new regulations. See John D. Graham, Saving
Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 460-63 (2008).
Furthermore, while we recognize that Executive Order 12,866 and OIRA guidance
provide that agencies should analyze alternatives in their regulatory impact analyses,
the agency chooses what these alternatives are, and they need not necessarily have
anything to do with unrules. As a practical matter, for reasons we discuss below in
Part III.B.2, it will be easier for strategically minded agencies to obscure carveouts and
escape OIRA oversight of them than it is to escape OIRA scrutiny of rules. Cf. Jennifer
Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1776-77
(2013) (discussing strategies agencies use to evade OIRA scrutiny).
Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17
N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 107, 117 (2008) (capitalization altered); see also Nicholas Bagley &
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260,
1272 (2006) (suggesting that “OIRA does not carefully scrutinize deregulatory costbenefit analyses”); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006) (“[W]hen agencies have offered proposals that
involve deregulation rather than increased regulation, OIRA has not required a costbenefit analysis.”); Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 542 (1987) (“[OMB] has applied its criteria selectively, requiring
no analysis for proposals that eliminate regulation, and no cost analysis for those that
relax existing standards.” (footnote omitted)).
Exec. Order No. 13,771, 3 C.F.R. 284 (2018), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note.
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solely on the costs of regulatory obligations and required that, “for every one
new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for
elimination” to offset the costs of the new regulation.253 Neither the
executive order nor OIRA’s implementing guidance provided any assurance
that the agency or OIRA will do anything to estimate the lost benefits from
the regulatory obligations alleviated or eliminated.254 All in all, Executive
Order 13,771 gave agencies additional incentives for amending regulations to
carve out obligations rather than to impose new ones.255
When it comes to dispensations, administrative law’s procedural disparities
are at their most stark. Most dispensations—of which simple decisions not to
pursue enforcement are surely the most numerous—are granted through
informal adjudication, about which the APA says virtually nothing.256 Of course,
this absence of procedural attention also applies to any obligation-imposing
informal adjudications, but, even so, obligation-alleviating dispensations will be
inherently less constrained. An obligation-imposing informal adjudication needs
to be based on some underlying obligation established through a more structured
process. By contrast, obligations can be alleviated informally without anything
more than the exercise of an agency’s enforcement discretion.257
Even when an agency’s dispensations have been based on an underlying
agency process—such as the establishment of authority to grant dispensations in
a regulation—that underlying process will treat dispensation authority more
lightly. For example, provisions in a proposed agency regulation that would
authorize dispensations in the future will be basically given a free pass with
respect to the White House regulatory-review process. The possible effects of a
waiver-authorizing provision in an otherwise economically significant new

253. Id. at 284.
254. See Joshua Linn & Alan Krupnick, Ninety-Six Regulatory Experts Express Concerns About

Trump Administration Reforms, RESOURCES (May 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/4NQJ-9CMF.
255. See Susan Dudley, Opinion, Regulating Within a Budget, REGUL. REV. (Apr. 23, 2018),

https://perma.cc/FX4E-NC9U (explaining how Executive Order 13,771 and related
initiatives “provide new incentives for agency staff to examine existing regulations
with the intent to modify or rescind cost-ineffective requirements”).
256. See Croston, supra note 133, at 314. Although Congress has sometimes separately
imposed specific procedural constraints on how agencies issue dispensations, these
procedures vary dramatically depending on the specific dispensation program at issue,
leaving this area of the law in what scholars have described as “procedural disarray.”
Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 32, at 1161; see also id. at 1166 (“Congress has failed to
specify procedures for many back-end adjudications; and . . . the process used for backend adjustments varies from statute to statute, and even within a statute itself.”);
NIELSON, supra note 33, at 39-41.
257. As discussed further in Part III.D below, judicial review of obligation-alleviating
informal adjudications is also less likely.
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regulation simply do not figure into OIRA’s review.258 Yet, as we have seen,
subsequent waivers can sometimes work to the detriment of a rule’s purpose.259
For example, when the EPA has in the past analyzed the economic impacts of its
annual establishment of the RFS, neither the agency’s Federal Register preambles
nor its underlying regulatory-impact analyses have included any quantified
estimates showing how the benefits or costs of the rule might vary depending on
whether the agency granted hardship exemptions authorized by the statute.260
In ways like these, agencies receive greater procedural room to maneuver
when they alleviate obligations than when they impose them. This is not to say
that all unrules escape all procedural scrutiny. But overall, administrative
procedure tends to treat unrules with a lighter touch than it does agency
actions imposing new obligations on private actors.
2.

Tilted transparency

Obligation imposition is also subject to more demanding requirements for
transparency than is obligation alleviation. Under the transparency provisions
of the APA—also known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—all agency
“substantive rules of general applicability” must be published in the Federal
Register, with no exceptions.261
258. Cf. Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., Exec. Off. of the President, Regulatory Impact Analysis:

A Primer (2011), https://perma.cc/LRW3-MEMA (making no mention of quantifying
the impacts of possible waivers or exemptions). The absence of any explicit attention
to the possibility of future dispensations in this primer matches what we have been
told in conversations with OIRA staff, namely that the regulatory-impact-analysis
process basically assumes away any future obligation alleviation. In effect, the neglect
of dispensation authority means OIRA assumes that a new regulation will be fully
implemented or that any waivers will be minimal or applied only when doing so will
be net beneficial.
259. For a discussion of the risks of unrules, see Part I.B above.
260. See, e.g., Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2018 and Biomass-Based
Diesel Volume for 2019, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,486 (Dec. 12, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 80); OFF. OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, EPA, EPA-420-R-10-006, RENEWABLE FUEL
STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2) REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010), https://perma.cc/
KFR5-GVFP. The preamble to the EPA’s renewal of the fuel standard for the 2018-2019
period actually went out of its way to mention that “at this time no exemptions have
been approved for 2018”—even though media reports indicate that the agency had been
fielding requests for waivers from Carl Icahn’s refinery and upwards of two dozen
other refineries. 82 Fed. Reg. at 58,523; see also Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice,
Exclusive: EPA Gives Giant Refiner a “Hardship” Waiver from Regulation, REUTERS (Apr. 3,
2018, 9:03 AM), https://perma.cc/TH5C-3FDK.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). With the passage of the E-Government Act of 2002, agencies are
now required to make all of their rules, as well as materials related to the development
of those rules, available online. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347,
§ 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915-16 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (Federal
Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services)). The federal
government has created both Regulations.gov and a website for the Federal Register to
footnote continued on next page
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Although this strict publication requirement for obligation imposition
will ensure the transparency of expressly stated carveouts, implicit carveouts
can be obscured within, or even entirely left out of, the text of a regulation.262
Furthermore, dispensations can be completely opaque, and necessarily will be
when they result from handshake agreements or no-action letters exchanged
between agencies and regulatory obligatees.263 Granted, some agencies do, of
their own accord, provide transparency even with respect to dispensations—
the FCC, for example, deserves credit for docketing waiver requests and
decisions online264—but these voluntary efforts to provide transparency
surrounding dispensations are far from the norm.
To assess the public availability of information about dispensations,
we examined random samples of seventy-five provisions in each of the
United States Code and the CFR that authorize agencies to grant dispensations to

facilitate online access to rulemaking information. See REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://perma.cc/2G6H-WCSG (archived Dec. 30, 2020) (to locate, click “View the live
page”); FED. REG., https://perma.cc/8A66-5HHS (archived Dec. 30, 2020). In addition, the
Regulatory Flexibility Act requires each agency twice a year to release an agenda of
essentially all the rules it is planning to develop so the public can keep track of rules
even before they are formally proposed. Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602; see
also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642-43 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 note. The APA itself requires all notices of proposed rulemakings to be published
in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
262. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
263. Agencies’ general policies of nonenforcement—which follow from the same discretion
that allows agencies to grant dispensations that effectively act as carveouts—arguably
may even be kept from disclosure to the public as “information compiled for law
enforcement purposes” that “could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
264. The FCC can waive any of its own regulations, see 47 C.F.R. § 1.925(a) (2019), and it
further has significant waiver authority to “forbear” enforcement of provisions of the
Communications Act under 47 U.S.C. § 160, see Deacon, supra note 76, at 1568-69. This
sweeping dispensation authority does not require any transparency when the FCC
issues a waiver. Still, the FCC manages to maintain a comprehensive and open-access
database in which any individual can search for relevant information on a request for a
waiver or forbearance. The information the FCC makes available tracks the
progression of the agency’s decisionmaking process: the docketing of the petition; the
collection of public comments (itself a self-imposed but laudable reform in the domain
of dispensations); and the Commission’s final decisions. See EDOCS, FCC,
https://perma.cc/G3L5-F68D (archived Dec. 30, 2020). The quality of these records may
be one reason why these FCC dispensations appear to be more routinely subjected to
scrutiny by reviewing courts. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users Comm. v. FCC, 572
F.3d 903, 904-05 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding against an arbitrary-and-capricious
challenge the FCC’s decision to grant forbearance of dominant-carrier regulations to
incumbent local exchange carriers). After all, “[a]dequate review of a determination
requires an adequate record, if the review is to be meaningful.” United States v. N.S.
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Table 3
Transparency of Dispensations Authorized in Statutes and Regulations
Percentage of sampled provisions
Source

Transparency
requirement

Any online
information

List of dispensation
recipients

U.S. Code

15%

39%

20%

CFR

20%

47%

16%

regulated businesses.265 We first reviewed the relevant statutory or regulatory
text to determine whether it contained any requirements related to public
disclosure of its dispensations—even if only information about their existence
or the way to petition for relief. Only 15% and 20% of the provisions in our
samples, respectively, contained anything remotely looking like a requirement
or recommendation that an agency disclose any information about these
dispensations.266 Although we could find some information online about some
of the dispensations authorized by these provisions, for more than half we
could find no information about even their possible existence. For no more
than 20% of the dispensations authorized did agencies provide lists indicating
for whom they had waived an obligation.
Based on our analysis, it is clear that the U.S. administrative state tolerates
a considerable degree of secrecy over dispensations, even though the federal
government is governed by a systematic requirement to ensure that rules are
openly available to all.267 The notion of secret obligations is antithetical to the
rule of law268—but not so, it seems, is the existence of secret alleviations of
obligations.
265. We created the sample by searching in Lexis through the United States Code and the

CFR for section headings that have the terms waiver, exemption, or variance—using the
search section (waiver or variance or exemption)—and then coding a random subsample of
the results. Trained research assistants working under our close direction conducted
the coding, with intercoder reliability measures all in the acceptable range.
266. See infra Table 3.
267. One exception to this trend in openness of regulations that has provoked considerable
objections from scholars and some governmental reforms lies with the practice of
incorporation by reference. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access
to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV.
737 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013).
268. FULLER, supra note 69, at 49-51; Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, 808 (2018)
(analyzing the use of secret law in the executive branch and identifying “distinct
characteristics of specific secret laws that make them particularly odious—or
particularly benign”).
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3.

The lack of self-reinforcing incentives

Another asymmetry exists in agencies’ incentives to comply with procedural
and transparency requirements for rules versus unrules. That is, even if
agencies did need to follow identical procedural steps or to disclose the same
information when imposing an obligation as when alleviating one, they will
necessarily have an inherent reason for following those requirements when
creating rules that does not apply when creating unrules.
Procedural and transparency requirements become effectively selfreinforcing with respect to obligation imposition.269 This is because
obligations are really only obligatory when an agency can enforce them. But
agency officials know that if they ever wish to enforce a regulation, they must
follow the proper procedural steps in developing it, including publishing the
regulation in the Federal Register.270 With respect to transparency
requirements, failure to provide proper notice gives any purported obligatee a
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause objection to any enforcement.271 Both
the Federal Register Act and the APA also make clear that any regulation that
has not been properly published cannot be enforced.272 Unless an agency has
given an obligatee sufficient actual notice, “a person may not in any manner be
required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be
published in the Federal Register and not so published.”273 Even in cases where
the technical requirements of publication arguably have been met, courts stand
ready to police the boundaries of fair notice for regulatory obligatees who
become the target of enforcement without sufficient warning.274
269. For a discussion of the self-reinforcing nature of transparency requirements, see Cary

270.

271.
272.

273.
274.

Coglianese, Illuminating Regulatory Guidance, 9 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 243, 246-47,
269 (2020). On self-reinforcing rules more generally, see Edward K. Cheng, Structural
Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655 (2006).
See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (providing that “agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or
criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement”); id. § 706(2)(D) (providing as a basis for
setting aside agency action the lack of “observance of procedure required by law”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
On the need for rules to be published if they are to be treated as valid, see 44 U.S.C.
§ 1507 (“A document required . . . to be published in the Federal Register is not valid as
against a person who has not had actual knowledge of it until . . . a copy [is] made
available for public inspection . . . .”); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (flush language) (similarly
precluding any validity to regulations or other documents required to be published in
the Federal Register); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (requiring publication in the Federal
Register of agencies’ notices of proposed rulemakings).
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (flush language).
See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In the absence
of notice—for example, where the regulation is not sufficiently clear to warn a party
about what is expected of it—an agency may not deprive a party of property by
imposing civil or criminal liability.”).
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Unrules, by contrast, do not bring with them the same inherent selfreinforcing incentives for agencies to follow procedural and transparency
requirements. With an unrule, the agency does not want to bring an
enforcement action. It is seeking to alleviate obligations, not to create a duty
that could be backed up by the threat of enforcement. As a result, with unrules,
any procedural defects or failures to provide required transparency will not
necessarily impede the agency from achieving its obligation-alleviation goal.275
The agency will still typically be able to accomplish the same objective simply
by refraining from enforcing a rule against those entities included in a
procedurally defective unrule.276
Thus, even though procedural niceties and robust transparency constitute
defining features of administrative law,277 agency compliance with procedural
and transparency requirements is not likely to be symmetric as between rules
and unrules.278 Even if the same procedural and transparency requirements

275. This is similar to the problem inherent in getting agencies to be more transparent

about issuing nonbinding guidance documents. See Coglianese, supra note 269, at 24546. An agency’s failure to follow a transparency requirement in issuing guidance does
not, as an intrinsic legal matter, deprive the agency of what it often intends to achieve
by issuing guidance, namely to communicate information—at least to those who in fact
receive such guidance. Mandating transparency on its own simply does not provide an
intrinsic incentive for agencies to follow those mandates for guidance or for obligation
alleviation in the same way that they inherently provide an incentive with respect to
obligation imposition.
276. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (holding that agency decisions about
whether to enforce legal requirements in individual cases are presumptively
unreviewable by courts). Of course, this is not to deny that sometimes agencies could
still have other incentives to comply with applicable transparency and procedural
requirements. For example, sometimes agencies may not be able to accomplish the
same policy objective through nonenforcement, especially in those instances where a
private right of action exists. Nevertheless, it remains true that there will not be the
same intrinsic incentive for unrules that exists with the imposition of obligations,
since in the latter case an agency’s ability to threaten to enforce new obligations will
always be conditional on its having followed the applicable procedural and
transparency requirements.
277. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 63-70 (3d ed. 2003); Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson,
Report, Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 930-31 (2009).
278. On top of these legal structures that make procedural and transparency requirements
self-reinforcing when agencies impose obligations, agencies also have a practical
incentive to make their obligations widely known. When they impose legal
obligations, they seek to affect obligatees’ behavior, which can happen only if those
obligatees know about a rule. Cf. Walters, supra note 157, at 160 & n.341 (highlighting
that agency staff, particularly lawyers, push agencies to clarify legal obligations ex ante
to improve compliance with regulation). This enforcement incentive presumably does
not apply with the same force to those carved out of a rule.
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applied to unrules as they do to rules (which they do not), agencies have less
reason to comply with these requirements when it comes to unrules.279
C. Lopsidedness in Judicial Oversight
Without knowledge of even the existence of an unrule, it is impossible for
those negatively affected by it to challenge it in court.280 But even with such
knowledge, those who seek judicial review of agency actions alleviating
obligations can still face disproportionate barriers to relief, ultimately leaving
rules with a somewhat lopsided degree of judicial oversight relative to unrules.
In this Subpart, we explain why judicial oversight is generally both less
available and less searching for unrules.
1.

Barriers to legal mobilization

The lopsidedness in judicial oversight of unrules begins with a bias in terms
of who is more likely to bring agency actions to the courts for review—and
whether those actions are more likely to be rules or unrules. Administrative
law—and the courts’ ability to reinforce that law—is particularly susceptible to a
bias in the mobilization of legal claims.281 Courts are reactive institutions that
279. Although in theory members of the public could rely on FOIA and request information

about agencies’ carveouts and dispensations, they must take on the expense of litigating
the request if it is rejected. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). This is hardly on par with the
proactive or affirmative disclosure that is encouraged by prohibitions on enforcement
of nontransparent obligations. Often requests for information about carveouts or
dispensations will be akin to a fishing expedition, since the requestor may not know
the bounds of what exists. See generally Stephanie Alvarez-Jones, Note, “Too Big to
FOIA”: How Agencies Avoid Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1055, 1064-66 (2018) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), which requires an agency to
respond only to requests that “reasonably describe[ ]” the records sought). Decisions to
carve out certain actors or activities from the scope of a rulemaking might be made
early on in the process before there is any requirement to publish the proposed rule’s
text, and such informal, preliminary decisions may have no documentation
whatsoever. Likewise, dispensations could have been made entirely informally—
memorialized in a private letter or verbal assurance rather than in the pages of the
Federal Register. For all of these reasons, members of the public will frequently lack
enough knowledge even to know to ask for a specific dispensation for which they
might need information. After all, it was only because of a leak to the press that the
public and business competitors learned about EPA’s decision to grant waivers to Carl
Icahn’s refinery and dozens of other refineries. See Renshaw & Prentice, supra note 122.
280. Cf. Petition for Review at 3-7, Renewable Fuels Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, No. 18-1154 (D.C. Cir.
June 4, 2018) (arguing that the petition was not time barred because the “EPA did not
even provide public notice that it had received or had acted upon any recent requests
for an extension of a small refinery exemption”).
281. Political scientist E. E. Schattschneider called this a “mobilization of bias,” by which he
meant “a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression
of others” that meant that “[s]ome issues are organized into politics while others are
footnote continued on next page
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depend on affected interests bringing issues to them for their review. To activate
administrative law, affected interests must have resources: information, time,
money, and connections. Disparities in such resources within society in practice
lead to imbalances of power and, ultimately, to a bias in judicial oversight of the
administrative state.
Pathbreaking studies by Mancur Olson and James Q. Wilson have
illuminated fundamental dynamics that contribute to a bias in legal
mobilization. Olson focused on the political economy underlying the provision
of collective goods—where all members of the public can benefit from a policy
even if they do not contribute to its implementation.282 In such circumstances,
Olson showed, individuals have an incentive to free ride, letting someone else
work to bring about the collective good. This basic logic means that collective
goods will often go undersupplied, impeded largely by the transaction costs of
“identifying, organizing, and coordinating” groups of individuals with shared
but individually modest interests—and then getting them to cooperate and
invest in collective action.283
Wilson applied a similar logic to explain the behavior of groups active in
regulatory politics. He started with the basic truth that any regulation creates
benefits for some individuals or groups while imposing costs on others. He
then showed that the prospects for group mobilization to resist costs or claim
benefits depend on how these costs and benefits are distributed. According to
Wilson, because a regulatory position “will confer general (though perhaps
small) benefits at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society,” the
“incentive to organize is strong for opponents of the policy but weak for the
beneficiaries, and since the political system provides many points at which
opposition can be registered, it may seem astonishing that regulatory
legislation of this sort is ever passed.”284
Together, Olson’s and Wilson’s work reveals that the deck is often stacked
against the diffuse beneficiaries of regulation, especially when they are up
against the concentrated targets of regulation—the cost bearers—who are
better able to overcome inertia and mobilize to activate administrative law to
organized out.” E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 71 (1960).
282. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965):
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will
not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to
do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or
group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they
help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives.

283. Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L.

REV. 217, 220 (2014) (citing OLSON, supra note 282, at 2, 22, 33-36).
284. Wilson, supra note 112, at 370.
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constrain agencies in their imposition of obligations. Those upon whom
obligations are imposed directly bear the associated costs of regulatory burdens
and have reason to go to court to challenge the obligations. And, on the
flipside, the creation of carveouts and the granting of dispensations can be
enormously valuable to regulated entities facing the imposition of costly
obligations, while any harms from unrules—such as unrealized regulatory
benefits to the general public—may manifest only as diffuse losses, which will
be more difficult to organize to resist through litigation.
One might think about the exemption Carl Icahn and big oil companies
secured from the normal obligation of petroleum refineries to use renewable
fuels.285 Icahn’s company gained big; it had a strong incentive to get involved
in the process to secure an exemption. Meanwhile, individual members of the
general public who might have stood to gain from having more renewable fuel
in the nation’s fuel supply—to the extent that such fuel delivers environmental
benefits or reduces the nation’s vulnerability to global oil price shocks—each
presumably lost only a small fraction of the overall benefit that the rule would
deliver, if applied broadly. This basic bias in the incentives for legal
mobilization has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies.286
As a result of this bias, those who would lose from unrules are less likely to
activate the courts to uphold the parts of administrative law that conceivably
do apply to unrules.287 In other words, the lopsidedness in judicial review
between rules and unrules begins even before any lawsuits are filed.
Differences in incentive structures and litigant resources will likely mean that
agencies’ efforts to alleviate obligations systematically receive less judicial
scrutiny than efforts to impose obligations.

285. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
286. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C.

KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES,
AND WHY (2009); Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-proposal
Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RSCH. &
THEORY 373 (2012); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 121. But see CROLEY, supra note 235
(qualifying public-choice accounts of regulatory processes). By no means, of course,
does the existence of this bias mean that industry always wins in the regulatory state.
See Michael E. Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki, Preface to BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, at ix (Michael E.
Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki eds., 2007) (explaining that businesses do not always
prevail in the policy process); Gabriel Scheffler, Failure to Capture: Why Business Does
Not Control the Rulemaking Process, 79 MD. L. REV. 700, 704 (2020) (arguing that “the view
of the rulemaking process as captured is not warranted”).
287. We acknowledge that, as Richard Stewart has argued, today’s interest group climate is
surely more balanced than it was prior to the 1960s, but this does not mean it no longer
exhibits any bias. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670, 1716 (1975).
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2.

Barriers to getting into court

The bias in legal mobilization is only reinforced by the doctrine of
standing—a constitutional prerequisite to invoking the “judicial power” of
federal courts. As the Supreme Court articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife288 and subsequent cases, for a federal court to review agency action, a
challenger must meet three well-known elements: (i) a “concrete and
particularized” injury that is “‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical’”; (ii) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of”; and (iii) a demonstration that a favorable court decision can
redress the injury.289 Almost by definition, these elements can be readily
satisfied for anyone upon whom the government has imposed a new
obligation: The injury is the imposed obligation, which is caused by the
challenged imposition and fully redressable if a court finds that the
government acted unlawfully.290
Yet for anyone challenging an unrule, showing a “particularized” injury
will often prove more difficult, especially when the harm is spread across the
public rather than concentrated in an individual who has been or will be
demonstrably affected.291 On precisely these grounds, courts have in recent
288. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
289. Id. at 560-61 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
290. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (noting that the Court

has “held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an
intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional
interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution
thereunder’” (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979))); see also Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 361 F. Supp. 3d 60, 64 (D.D.C. 2019) (“It is
relatively easy to establish standing when you are the regulated party; it is more
difficult to do so when the government fails to regulate the conduct of someone
else.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 457 (“[T]he requirements of causation
and redressability . . . might well be used to prevent regulated entities from having
access to court on the ground that it is purely speculative whether a judicial ruling—
for example, requiring compliance with some procedural requirement—will actually
redress the alleged injury. But we have been unable to find even a single case in
which the court of appeals has used standing doctrine in that way.”). Courts have on
occasion erected other barriers to the redress of grievances about unrules. See
Fertilizer Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (allowing EPA
exemptions to remain in place despite concluding that the EPA “failed to provide
adequate notice and comment,” in part because “no party challenged the specific
exemptions set by the EPA”).
291. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (“When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else, much more is needed.”); see also Karl S. Coplan, Petition Clause Interests
and Standing for Judicial Review of Administrative Lawmaking, ADMIN. & REGUL. L.
NEWS, Spring 2009, at 3, 3 (“Current standing doctrine . . . favors petitioning activity
by regulatory [targets] arguing for less regulation, for whom standing is presumed,
while it disfavors petitioning activity by regulatory beneficiaries arguing for more
footnote continued on next page
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years become more reluctant to grant standing to organizations seeking to
challenge agency actions that eliminate or lessen regulatory obligations.292
As a result, the individual target of a new obligation will almost always be
able to object to its imposition, but courts are less likely to hear objections to
obligation alleviation. Those most directly affected—the recipient of a
dispensation or the beneficiary of a carveout—will hardly ever object,293
leaving third parties as the only potential challengers.294 Standing doctrine
will often present a meaningful barrier for those third parties to overcome if
they wish to challenge an unrule.295

292.

293.

294.

295.

regulation, who . . . must meet a high burden of establishing distinct ‘injury in fact,’
causation, and redressibility [sic] . . . .”); Zachary J.F. Kolodin, Note, Standing to
Challenge Regulatory Failure in the Age of Preemption, 22 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 157, 166
(2015) (“Since industrial actors are regulated directly . . . it is far more likely that an
industrial actor’s complaint with respect to a regulation will suffice for standing
than will a regulatory beneficiary’s complaint.”). Although it may be more difficult
to satisfy the standing test when challenging unrules, we do not deny that it still
may be possible. After all, as Justice Kavanaugh has noted in a plurality opinion, “the
Court has squarely held that a plaintiff who suffers unequal treatment has standing
to challenge a discriminatory exception that favors others.” Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol.
Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2355 (2020) (plurality opinion) (citing Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-40 (1984)). It may be that competitors of firms that
benefit from an unrule may be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement more
easily than other types of unrule challengers.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 453-54 (noting that in recent years the D.C.
Circuit “has invoked the injury-in-fact test to deny standing to environmental,
labor, and consumer organizations complaining of what they see as insufficient
regulation”). These patterns in standing cases are traceable to the intellectual
foundations of administrative law, which elevate the protection of private rights
and property above public rights. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization
of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988) (noting that, in the U.S.
administrative law tradition, “[t]he interests of regulated industries could be
protected through the courts, whereas the interests of regulatory beneficiaries were
to be vindicated through politics or not at all”).
The recipient of a dispensation presumably would object only if it believes a waiver
it received was more limited than one to which it was entitled by statute. See, e.g.,
Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312 (declining to vacate exemptions that were created
without adequate notice, because “no party challenged the specific exemptions” and
the only “complaint about the exemptions” from the parties was that they were “not
broad enough”).
Although § 555(b) of the APA opens the possibility of third-party intervention during
agency adjudications, courts treat such intervention as discretionary at best. See
Nichols v. Bd. of Trs. of the Asbestos Workers Loc. 24 Pension Plan, 835 F.2d 881, 897
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
The D.C. Circuit has noted that “ ‘when the [party] is not . . . the object of the
government action or inaction [being] challenge[d], standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily “substantially more difficult” to establish.’ ” New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
294 F.3d 164, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (first alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
562) (holding that a radio station licensee could not challenge the grant of a license to a
competitor station).
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3.

Less searching judicial review

Even when litigants can overcome standing barriers, other doctrines make
courts’ scrutiny on the merits less searching in cases involving certain kinds of
unrules. When dispensations derive from an agency’s exercise of its
nonenforcement discretion in individual cases, for example, prevailing
doctrine makes these unrules virtually immune from judicial review.296 In
Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that agencies’ decisions not to
enforce are presumed to fall within the unreviewable category of actions
“committed to agency discretion” by law.297 For similar reasons, courts
reviewing waivers issued under generally standardless authorizations—such as
those noting that an agency “may waive” various provisions298—will be more
likely to deem such unrules as “committed to agency discretion.”299 A district
court held completely unreviewable the Department of Homeland Security’s
waiver of some two dozen laws that otherwise could have applied to the
construction of a wall on the border with Mexico.300 Even when a waiver is
deemed reviewable, courts sometimes appear to apply a lighter-touch
arbitrariness review to such unrules.301
296. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 43, at 1097 (surveying a number of “holes” that limit the

297.

298.
299.

300.
301.

coverage of the conventional presumption of reviewability). Nonenforcement in the
administrative state has a parallel in prosecutorial discretion in criminal law. Rachel
Barkow, who contrasts administrative law’s emphasis on the control of discretion with
several traditionally less constrained “pockets of mercy” within the criminal-justice
system, notes that “most commentators worry more about the coercive power of
prosecutors rather than [that] their power [is too] lenient”—that is, they worry about a
power to enforce obligations (in this case, criminal prohibitions) rather than the
effective power to alleviate them. Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1352, 1355 (2008).
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Court justified its holding in
Heckler in part by reference to a disproportionate concern about regulators’ obligationimposition power, writing that “when an agency refuses to act it generally does not
exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does
not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” Id.
See, e.g., supra note 194 and accompanying text.
See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 832 (interpreting § 701(a)(2) as applying when there is “no
meaningful standard” to guide judicial review of an agency’s actions). Or, if courts do
find the agency action reviewable in such instances, the spongy nature of the statutory
standard might well lead a court to conclude that the agency is entitled to deference. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). But see MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994) (declining to defer to
the FCC’s broad construction of authority to “modify” a legal requirement).
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 218, 224-25 (D.D.C. 2019).
See, e.g., C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 177, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1996)
(applying rational-basis review to the Department of Health and Human Service’s
granting of a section 1115 waiver to New Jersey, and rejecting out of hand the
suggestion that the “absence of formal findings” rendered the granting of the waiver
arbitrary and capricious, so long as “the Secretary rationally could have determined
footnote continued on next page
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The story is not much different once an agency imposes obligations on
some actors or activities, but could plausibly have gone further to encompass
other similar actors or activities. Although one might think that simple
arbitrary-and-capricious principles would permit regulatory beneficiaries to
challenge an agency’s decision not to impose an obligation related to the
purpose or scope of the rule,302 that is not always the case. Courts have
developed a host of doctrines that tend to bless agency decisions to hold back
on obligation imposition—or at least they tend to treat those decisions with
little serious scrutiny. For instance, the “de minimis doctrine” amounts
effectively to a judicial approval of limited exemptions for certain conduct, as
long as the obligations that would otherwise apply are so minor that they
would only “yield a gain of trivial or no value.”303 It has even been said that the
power to develop exceptions is “inherent in most statutory schemes,” even
when the text does not specifically authorize such power.304
A related “administrative necessity” doctrine can sometimes allow agencies
to develop more categorical exemptions even when statutes provide no
explicit authorization.305 As the D.C. Circuit explained in Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, categorical exemptions should be allowed “where the conventional
course” for dealing with impossibility through “case-by-case determinations[]
would, as a practical matter, prevent the agency from carrying out the mission
assigned to it by Congress.”306 In other words, rather than expending resources
administering dispensations, an agency will sometimes be allowed to save itself
time by writing a carveout.
Finally, agencies can also sidestep challenges to carveouts by invoking the
“one-step-at-a-time” doctrine. In essence, this doctrine says that agencies may
“promulgate regulations in a piecemeal fashion” rather than in one omnibus
regulation that comprehensively addresses all issues germane to the regulatory

302.

303.
304.

305.
306.

that the [state program] was ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives’ of [Aid to
Families with Dependent Children]” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a))). Of course, we
acknowledge that there are cases where courts have looked carefully at unrules. See, e.g.,
Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 426-30 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (vacating 40 C.F.R. § 257.101).
Arguably, giving unrules a lighter touch runs contrary to the spirit of the Court’s
canonical decision on judicial review under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious clause.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 41 (1983) (“We believe that the rescission or modification of an occupant-protection
standard is subject to the same [arbitrary-and-capricious] test.”).
Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id. at 360 (“[W]e think most regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, permit
such agency showings in appropriate cases.”). The Supreme Court’s decision in the Little
Sisters of the Poor case is in a similar vein. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
See Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
636 F.2d at 358.
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goal.307 Even when Congress has mandated that an agency develop a regulatory
scheme, this doctrine effectively gives the agency a pass when it comes to
carveouts, at least in its initial rules. In some sense, this is the opposite power of
what scholars have called “regulatory bundling.”308 It is the power to engage in
regulatory unbundling.309
Perhaps the generally lighter-touch judicial review of unrules grows out of
a misunderstanding of unrules’ prevalence and their consequences. For
instance, in justifying the Supreme Court’s decision in Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance to hold unreviewable an agency’s decision not to issue rules,
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion characterized disputes over what we call
unrules as mere “abstract policy disagreements.”310 Yet in contrast to Justice
Scalia’s suggestion that unrules are relatively innocuous, we have shown in this
Article that unrules can have significant consequences for public health and
safety, interest-group influence, and the rule of law. The ubiquity of unrules
and their corresponding risks show why courts should take seriously claims of
injury from an agency’s decision to create differential treatment via unrules.
Courts should resist concluding that agency unrules are committed to agency
discretion or that no law can guide judicial review of unrules.311 Instead, courts
should ensure that the presumption of reviewability of agency action applies as
much to unrules as to rules.312
D. Steps Toward Reorienting Administrative Law
The unified framework and empirical analysis we have provided in this
Article show that administrative discretion is considerably broader than many
307. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also 2 AM.

308.

309.

310.
311.

312.

JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 131 (West 2020) (“The one-step-at-a-time doctrine rests on
the notion that since agencies have great discretion to treat a problem partially, the
court of appeals should not strike down a regulation if it is a first step toward a
complete solution.”).
See Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L.J. 1174, 1176-79
(2019); LEE ANNE FENNELL, SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW AND
LIFE 212-14 (2019).
There are obviously parallels here to the Chenery doctrine, which says that agencies
generally have discretion to engage in policymaking through rulemaking or through
adjudication. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II ), 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004).
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (holding
that 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) applies to preclude judicial review of agency action whenever
the operative statute provides no law to guide a court’s review).
Cf. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235-36 (2019)
(explaining why the presumption of reviewability should be overcome only “by an
unambiguous statutory provision that plainly precludes jurisdiction,” but concluding
that the waiver in the case was supported by such a preclusion provision).
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judges and administrative law scholars typically assume. Yet today,
administrative law continues to focus much more on one facet of that
discretion—namely, discretion in imposing regulatory obligations—with much
judicial and academic commentary overlooking the “second face” of
administrative discretion: that which agencies exercise over the alleviation of
obligations.313 The real-world effects of this second face of discretionary power
may simply be harder to see because of the biases we have discussed in the
transparency requirements, administrative procedures, and judicial-review
doctrines that govern unrules. But once one’s eyes are opened to seeing the
operation of the second face of administrative power, to recognizing that it too
poses risks of error or abuse, and finally to understanding that current
administrative law doctrines and practices fail to address these risks, it then
follows that judges and scholars should consider the task of reorienting or
rebalancing administrative law.
Rebalancing administrative law is of course a substantial undertaking—
one that requires determining precisely how to effectuate appropriate
doctrinal and institutional change. Choices will need to be made about which
doctrines (for example, the logical-outgrowth test or the law of standing)
should be modified and precisely how those doctrines and procedures should
be modified. Making these decisions wisely will require careful analysis, due
consideration of tradeoffs, and proper attentiveness to potential unintended
consequences. In making these decisions, reformers would do well to aim for
symmetrical treatment of unrules wherever possible.314 Toward that goal, any
or all of the doctrines and procedures we have reviewed in this Part should be
on the table.
Pulling back the curtain, as we have begun to do here, is a vital first step.
But charting the path forward will be difficult if unrules continue to remain as
obscure as they have been. Thus, the most important immediate step to take is
313. We acknowledge seminal work in political science that refers to a “second face” of

governmental power that is essentially the power to refrain from exercising power. See
generally Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
947, 948 (1962); MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION: A STUDY
OF NON-DECISIONMAKING IN THE CITIES 18-26 (1971); STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL
VIEW 20-25 (2d ed. 2005). In law, the two faces of power have been described as the
“power to command”—or what we call obligation imposition—and the “power to
defer”—or what we call obligation alleviation. Coglianese & Yoo, supra note 89, at 159196. Between the extremes of heightened judicial scrutiny and no scrutiny at all “lies the
power to defer,” although it lies “usually close to the ‘no constraint whatsoever’ end of
the spectrum, . . . at least absent any specific guidelines for action contained within an
applicable statute.” Id. at 1596.
314. See generally Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of
American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455 (2020) (arguing that administrative
law is increasingly marked by an asymmetry in the context of interpretive discretion,
and cataloguing a variety of reasons why that trend is troubling).

960

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

to increase the transparency of unrules. Doing so will provide a basis for muchneeded additional research and will help provide a way to ground decisions
about future doctrinal reform. It could also help, in its own way, to address
some of the risks of unrules—producing some sunlight that might serve as a
disinfectant.315 To that end, we close our inquiry by offering a few suggestions
for improving the transparency of both dispensations and carveouts.
To address the obscurity of dispensations, Congress or the President could
require, or agencies could impose on themselves, the consistent practice of
maintaining online lists of granted dispensations. Similar publication
requirements have been imposed by executive order on agencies with respect
to their guidance documents.316 As noted above, some agencies are already
following this practice by publishing lists of dispensation recipients.317 It
would not be asking too much to have agencies follow this practice across the
federal government.318
Improving access to records of requests for and decisions on dispensations
would go far in reducing the burdens of legal mobilization for the potential
beneficiaries of obligations that are being dispensed, and may even reduce
arbitrariness and abuse of power in the granting of dispensations. Of course,
we have noted already that transparency requirements imposed on agencies
suffer from a lack of self-reinforcing incentives to comply.319 Options exist to
alter incentives and improve compliance, such as the possibility of creating a
cause of action under FOIA for challenging generalized agency policies and
practices that lead to the underproduction of information, mandating
independent audits of agency records, or perhaps even imposing personal
liability on officials who willingly keep no-action letters from a public

315. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, 10

(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”).
316. See Exec. Order No. 13,891, 3 C.F.R. 371 (2020), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note.
317. See supra Part III.B.2.
318. Recent reports and recommendations issued by the Administrative Conference of the

United States also provide agencies with a source of best practices. See Adoption of
Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,927, 38,931-33 (Aug. 8, 2019); Adoption of
Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017).
319. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2017) (noting that certain features of FOIA “arguably create[] a
perverse incentive for officials to classify more, not less,” agency information as exempt
from disclosure); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 919-20
(2006) (acknowledging that “the transparency requirement is imposed . . . upon the state
apparatus, which may choose not to comply”); Heidi Kitrosser, “Trust Me” and
Transparency Do Not Mix, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/B2MWJBER (discussing the “intrinsic weakness of any transparency strategy that depends on
self-policing”).
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repository.320 These possibilities should be explored further in an effort to
improve the quality of recordkeeping on dispensations.
When it comes to reforming administrative law’s approach to carveouts, we
suggest two initial steps. First, mechanisms are needed that can better ensure that
carveouts are not lost in the shuffle of the rulemaking process. When agencies
publish notices of their proposed and final rules, in the future they could be
expected to provide fair notice to the public of any decisions about classes or
categories of potential regulatory targets that have been carved out of the rule,
with an explanation of why these classes or categories are not covered. Agencies
do sometimes disclose such information,321 and the anticipation of arbitraryand-capricious review by courts certainly give them some reason to discuss a
rule’s scope. But they are not otherwise required to discuss in detail the carveouts
that they create. Going forward, agencies could be required to include a separate
designated paragraph or section discussing a new or amended rule’s scope in each
preamble to a rule document in the Federal Register.322 This discussion would
provide the public with clearer information about those entities, activities, and
time periods covered and not covered by a rule.
The second step would be to make regulatory analysis more evenly
balanced between obligation imposition and alleviation. For example, OIRA
could demand that agencies make plain how unrules—both carveouts and
dispensations—figure into their regulatory proposals and account for them
explicitly in their relevant analyses. Best practices in regulatory analysis
already call upon agencies to quantify various uncertainties surrounding the
320. For a useful collection of enforcement mechanisms that could be modeled in this context,

see Pozen, supra note 319, at 1107-11.
321. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA 833-F-00-003, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: WHO’S
COVERED? DESIGNATION AND WAIVERS OF REGULATED SMALL MS4S (rev. 2012),
https://perma.cc/YC34-XYPB (explaining which municipal systems are regulated and
which are not under the agency’s stormwater-discharge regulations).
322. This proposal is not unlike other proposals that agencies be required to publish a
compact summary or scorecard of a proposed regulation’s costs and benefits. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1518 (2002)
(proposing that agencies provide a one-page summary of their regulatory-impact
analyses). A mandatory summary statement of individuals, entities, activities, and time
periods falling both within and outside of a regulation’s scope should be both simpler
and less controversial than even a summary of benefits and costs. To some extent, the
EPA’s standard template for rulemaking documents already calls for something close to
what we suggest in that it includes a standard section titled “Does this action apply to
me?” See, e.g., Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Update to the Refrigerant
Management Requirements Under the Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 82,272, 82,273
(Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). Of course, the EPA’s template exhibits
its own biased focus on obligation imposition rather than obligation alleviation, as the
agency uses this section of its template to indicate to whom the rule applies, avoiding
saying to whom it does not.

962

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

impacts of regulatory obligations.323 These best practices could be expanded to
encompass the expectation that agencies conduct sensitivity analyses around
the degree of implementation of their rules and consider possible adverse
consequences from any substantial exercise of obligation-alleviation authority
by the agency in the future. Doing so would not only promote better agency
decisionmaking; it would also put the public on better notice of the effects of
unrules. Furthermore, retrospective studies of the actual use of dispensations
could help provide better information about the implementation of
regulations, in turn improving ex ante efforts to estimate the actual benefits
and costs of proposed regulations.324
We do not pretend, of course, that these various steps toward increased
transparency of both carveouts and dispensations will fully correct the
imbalance in the administrative law system. But the first step—which we have
taken in this Article—is to recognize that unrules are ubiquitous, that they
present risks, and that they currently escape the full scrutiny given to agency
decisions to impose rules. Only with such recognition can lawyers, judges, and
legislators begin to develop more systematic reforms that will level the playing
field between obligation imposition and alleviation. In addition, with such
recognition, any initial efforts to increase the transparency of unrules in the
day-to-day practice of administrative agencies should help jumpstart a
virtuous circle of further deliberations over carefully calibrated reforms.
A variety of factors have undoubtedly contributed to the way in which
administrative law has tended to overlook unrules. In bringing greater
attention to the current administrative law system’s myopia, we do not mean
to claim anything here about how frequently agencies might deliberately take
advantage of the shadows that the system casts over their use of unrules.325 But
the current, imbalanced system of oversight does make it easier for agencies to
take shortcuts, and this system also fails to consider fully the consequences of
agencies’ obligation-alleviating decisions. Agencies, after all, routinely
confront the challenge of setting priorities and managing large tasks with
limited staff and budgets.326 That challenge poses risks of error even among the
323. See Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs., supra note 258, at 14-15.
324. Cf. Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REGUL.

ONLINE 57 (2013) (arguing for the expansion of retrospective reviews of the actual costs
and benefits of important regulations that previously went through OIRA review).
325. We have not attempted in this Article to analyze the political economy behind
agencies’ decisions to create rules (as opposed to the political-economy factors pushing
agencies to create unrules), although such an investigation would be worthwhile in
future scholarship.
326. Cf. PAUL R. VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR PROFESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT 48-49 (2017) (noting that the federal government has assumed many
more responsibilities over the decades without meaningfully increasing the number of
civil servants).
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most well-intentioned of public servants. It also necessitates careful
management of agencies’ power both to impose and alleviate obligations. Just
as it can take time and adequate resources to impose obligations in a thoughtful
and responsible manner, agencies—and their overseers—must recognize that
obligation-alleviating power also demands time and resources if it is to be
exercised with care. Taking steps to reduce administrative law’s bias in favor of
unrules could go a long way toward helping encourage more thoughtful, fair,
and effective efforts to alleviate obligations.
Conclusion
Outside the Federal Trade Commission building in Washington, D.C.,
stand two massive, limestone sculptures that neatly encapsulate the
conventional view of government regulation. In polished Art Deco style, the
sculptures each depict a muscular man grappling with a wildly excited
horse.327 Judging from the title the artist gave to this work—“Man Controlling
Trade”—the sculptures appear to have a straightforward meaning: The horse
represents the free market, with its dynamic and potentially dangerous energy,
while the man represents government’s attempt to control economic activity
and tame it to serve the public’s interest. Yet because the sculptures freeze the
man and the horse in stone, the meaning the artwork conveys visually is
actually more ambiguous. Is the man pulling the horse back and trying to
harness its energy, or is he instead simply struggling to release the horse from
its restraint?
Buried within this visual ambiguity lies a deeper truth about regulation: A
full account of the U.S. regulatory system must pay more attention to the fact
that this system not only imposes obligations but avoids and lifts them as well.
Every regulatory obligation contains its own limits—limits that carve some
actors or activities out of its scope—and agencies always have opportunities to
alleviate regulatory obligations even further by granting dispensations.
Although too often thought of as peripheral, unrules are an integral and
highly consequential part of the regulatory state. They can also introduce
distinctive risks of government failure. Not only can they undermine policy
effectiveness, but they can also provide a ready source of favoritism and
arbitrariness in administration. These risks are heightened by the fact that
obligation alleviation remains less constrained by administrative law.
Recognizing unrules’ ubiquity and centrality should make evident the
need to rebalance administrative law through additional efforts to increase the
oversight of, and constraints on, agencies’ discretion to alleviate obligations. At
327. Elliot

Carter, Man Controlling Trade—Washington,
https://perma.cc/D374-ALX3 (archived Dec. 30, 2020).
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a minimum, a reoriented administrative law would bring unrules out of the
shadows and subject them to more robust requirements for transparency.
Courts could also make more even-handed the law governing access to judicial
review and the application of that review. Oversight institutions such as OIRA
could scrutinize unrules more consistently so that the public has better
information about how obligation alleviation might affect the costs and
benefits of regulation.
Increased attention to unrules ultimately will advance the purposes served
by having government subject to the rule of law. If administrative law is to
control government so that it delivers meaningful public value and avoids
injustice, then the law and lawyers need to recognize and respond to all of the
consequential ways that government interacts with society, both those ways
that seek to bring trade under control and those that loosen restraints.
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Appendix
Examples of Regulatory Provisions Featuring Obligation-Alleviating Terms
Terms

waive
waives
waived
waiver
waivers
waiving

Examples
• “By application pursuant to § 1787.10, the Administrator may
waive the Buy American requirement upon a showing that
application of the requirement would be inconsistent with the
public interest or impractical for the [Rural Utilities Service]
Borrower.” 7 C.F.R. § 1787.13(a) (2020).
• “You may request that we waive any specific requirement of this
part. You may submit your request, with supporting
documentation, separately or as a part of your postmarket
surveillance submission to the address in § 822.8.” 21 C.F.R.
§ 822.29 (2020).
• “The Administrator may waive the provisions of this subpart for
a manufacturer or a specific engine family, as specified in
paragraphs (b) (1), (2) and (3) of this section.” 40 C.F.R. § 91.501(b)
(2020).

exempt
exempts
exempted
exemption
exemptions
exempting

• “Crude oil tankers engaged in coastwise trade are exempt from the
requirements of §§ 151.2025 (ballast water management . . .
requirements), 151.2060 (reporting), and 151.2070 (recordkeeping)
of this subpart.” 33 C.F.R. § 151.2015(b) (2020).
• “A vessel that is required to operate and maintain the mobile
transceiver unit continuously 24 hours a day throughout the
fishing year may be exempted from this requirement if a valid
exemption report . . . is received by [the National Marine Fisheries
Service Office of Law Enforcement] and the vessel is in
compliance with all conditions and requirements of the [vessel
monitoring system] exemption identified in this section and
specified in the exemption report.” 50 C.F.R. § 660.14(d)(4) (2019).
Appendix continued on next page

966

Unrules
73 STAN. L. REV. 885 (2021)

Terms

except
excepts
excepted
exception
exceptions
excepting

exclude
excludes
excluded
exclusion
exclusions
excluding

variance
variances

Examples
• “After the application of any pesticide on an agricultural
establishment, the agricultural employer shall not allow or direct
any worker to enter or to remain in the treated area before the
restricted-entry interval specified on the pesticide labeling has
expired, except as provided in this section.” 40 C.F.R. § 170.112(a)(1).
• “A regulated entity to which a final suspension order in effect is
applicable may request an exception from such order to allow it to
engage in a particular covered transaction with a suspended person
and any affiliates thereof.” 12 C.F.R. § 1227.10(a) (2020).
• “Streambeds, banks, and flood plains will not be disturbed, except
as may be necessary to construct, operate, and maintain
irrigation, fisheries, utilities, roads, and similar facilities or
improvements.” 36 C.F.R. § 292.16(c)(5) (2020).
• “Actions listed below when considered individually and
cumulatively do not have significant effects on the quality of the
human environment and are categorically excluded from [National
Environmental Policy Act] documentation.” 33 C.F.R. § 230.9.
• “Manufacturers and owners of locomotives that operate only on
non-standard gauge rails may ask us to exclude such locomotives
from this part by excluding them from the definition of
‘locomotive.’ ” 40 C.F.R. § 1033.5(e).
• “Pool plant means a plant, unit of plants, or a system of plants as
specified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section, but excluding a
plant specified in paragraph (h) of this section.” 7 CFR § 1124.7.
• “The [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] shall approve a
request for a variance or exemption if [it] determines that approval
of the request is warranted, in that it—(1) [w]ould more effectively
or equitably carry out the purposes of title IV . . . ; and (2) [w]ould
not significantly increase the risk of financial loss to the plan.” 29
C.F.R. § 4204.22(a) (2020).
• “A supplier of water may request the granting of a variance
pursuant to this subpart for a public water system within a State
that does not have primary enforcement responsibility by
submitting a request for a variance in writing to the
Administrator.” 40 C.F.R. § 142.41.
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